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Abstract 
 
Over the course of his research on the New Testament and early Christianity, the late 
Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder developed a provocative thesis that the historic 
Jewish-Christian schism was not historically inevitable. Yoder argued that it might have been 
possible for Jews and Christians to remain together as one people despite a difference of faith 
regarding the significance of Jesus Christ. While many found Yoder’s thesis refreshing, not all 
were convinced that it was without its significant theological problems. Peter Ochs, a Jewish 
pragmatic philosopher, was invited to respond to Yoder’s claims through commentary included 
in a posthumous publication of essays which contained Yoder’s provocative claims. Ochs argued 
that Yoder’s thesis perpetuated a form of Christian supersessionism, a Christian teaching that 
states that the Church has replaced Israel as the people of God. 
This thesis seeks to expose the roots of Yoder’s supersessionism for the purposes of 
repairing/reforming Yoder’s vision for the Church and the Church’s relation to the Jews. The 
argument of the thesis is that Yoder’s particular appropriation of a restitutionist perspective on 
Christian history, as a fundamental hermeneutic, is the root of his supersessionism. I demonstrate 
this to be the case through engaging two key essays in which Yoder treats the significance of the 
restitutionist perspective for his theology. After demonstrating this, I critically re-evaluate 
Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic with the help of Ochs among several other supporting authors 
in order to suggest specific ways that inheritors of Yoder might carry forward key elements to his 
thought without repeating his supersessionist mistake. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the course of his research on the New Testament and early Christianity, as well as 
through numerous exchanges with his Jewish friend Steven Schwartzschild, the late Mennonite 
theologian John Howard Yoder developed a provocative thesis that the historic Jewish-Christian 
schism “did not have to be.”1 Yoder was convinced that the schism did not have to do with the 
scandal of Christological confessions professed by the original disciples of Jesus. Rather, Yoder 
argued, the schism had more to do with the fourth century subversion and co-option of the 
original and radical vision of the Jewish Jesus of Nazareth by the Roman Empire and by Gentile 
converts with philosophical agendas alien to Jewish belief.2 
According to Yoder, Jesus was nothing less than a Jewish Rabbi debating with his fellow 
Jews about the right meaning of Jewish tradition by appealing to “the ‘original’ or the ‘radical’ 
meaning of teachings on the sovereignty of God and the imperative of obedience” for the people 
of God.3 Yoder argued that the Jewish teachings that Jesus proclaimed had distinct resonances 
with the teachings of the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah and his vision for Israelite life in exile 
in Babylon.4 Although Jesus and his disciples were “not in charge,” they were to trust that by 
“seeking the welfare of the city” (Jeremiah 29:7) where God had sent them, they would fulfil 
their divine calling as heralds of the New Age.5 Thus, according to Yoder, Jesus did not reject 
Jewish teaching, but argued for its proper or normative interpretation.6 Despite the fact that some 
                                                          
1
 John Howard Yoder, “It Did Not Have To Be,” in The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited, ed. Michael G. 
Cartwright and Peter Ochs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 43-66. (Hereafter, references will be to JCSR.) 
2
 Yoder, JCSR, 57, 72-75. 
3
 Yoder, JCSR, 49. 
4
 Yoder, JCSR, 191-192. 
5
 Yoder, JCSR, 49, 183-202. 
6
 Yoder, JCSR, 77. 
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Jews began to declare that in Jesus’ resurrection the Messianic age had indeed begun while 
others rejected that notion, both were Jewish responses to a Jewish claim; both represented 
“tense but tolerable, overlapping…Jewish and Christian identities.”7  
Perhaps surprisingly, Yoder found that this vision of the original teachings of the Jewish 
Jesus, severely neglected as he believed them to be in much of Christian history, had been 
uniquely attested to in his own Free Church tradition.8 In the context of the Radical Reformation 
period of history, Yoder argued that the Anabaptists of the Free Church tradition articulated a 
vision of the radical renewal of the church that took up the same emphasis on “the sovereignty of 
God and the imperative of obedience” that Jesus had highlighted in his teachings. By doing so, 
the Free Churches had recovered a Jewish vision without recognizing it. This vision was 
expounded by Yoder in a number of places throughout his writings and is identified by him 
under the label of a restitutionist perspective on Christian history. 9 
For Yoder, using the restitutionist perspective on Christian history to recover a vision of 
the Jewish Jesus held the potential for new forms of Christian faithfulness in the present, 
including a new relationship between Jews and Christians that was no longer haunted by the long 
history of Christian supersessionism and its use as a justification for a variety of forms of anti-
Semitism.10 If Jesus did not reject Judaism, then no longer could Christian traditions rightly hold 
to supersessionist doctrines that claimed that the Jews had been rejected by God and replaced or 
                                                          
7
 Yoder, JCSR, 48-49, 54. 
8
 See Yoder, JCSR, 105-119. 
9
 While space does not permit at this juncture a full definition of what makes for a “restitutionist perspective on 
Christian history” or what Yoder’s particular appropriation of that perspective looks like, the “Terminology” section 
below helps address this as does the content of chapter 2. 
10
 Supersessionism is the belief, articulated dogmatically throughout the Christian tradition in various ways, that the 
church has replaced Israel as God’s chosen people. For pertinent examinations of the origins and implications of 
supersessionism, see Kendall Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999). 
Soulen’s tri-partite account of supersessionism will be referenced throughout. Also, addressing the racial aspects to 
supersessionism which J. Kameron Carter claims are “[g]laringly absent” in Soulen’s work, see J. Kameron Carter’s 
Race: A Theological Account (New York: Oxford, 2008), 383. 
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superseded by the Church as God’s new people. Yoder developed this thesis, among many other 
related ones, over the course of twenty years and several essays which were eventually collected, 
first into a desktop packet which was shared among Yoder’s colleagues prior to his death, and 
then into a posthumous collection published as The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited. 
Not all were convinced, however, that what Yoder had achieved in the performance of his 
novel thesis was without its significant theological “burdens.” Peter Ochs, a Jewish pragmatic 
philosopher, was invited to respond to Yoder’s claims through commentary included in the 
posthumous work. Among the many “wonders” that he observed in Yoder’s thesis, Ochs 
nonetheless registered concerns that Yoder’s particular recovery of the Jewish Jesus still 
contained forms of supersessionism.11 According to Ochs, Yoder’s account of the Jewish Jesus 
led him to make four different types of claims that were supersessionist in form.12  
First, by virtue of his vision of Jesus’ claims regarding normative Judaism, Yoder 
claimed that, as a Christian, he knew what normative Judaism was properly to be and so also 
what would count as deviant Judaism.13 Ochs sees such a move as holding the potential to co-opt 
and singularize Jewish identity in a way that replays supersessionist strategies, which post-liberal 
                                                          
11
 Peter Ochs, “Commentary,” in JCSR, 40. Ochs’ critical engagement with the theology of John Howard Yoder 
began in the 2003 posthumous publication of JCSR. More recently, Ochs has continued his evaluation of Yoder’s 
theology in the publication Another Reformation: Postliberal Christianity and the Jews (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2011). Ochs has also directly engaged with Mennonites through conferences at Eastern Mennonite 
University in 2007 and Canadian Mennonite University in 2009. The latter conference resulted in the publication of 
The Free Church and Israel’s Covenant (Winnipeg: CMU Press, 2010). While Ochs will be the principal 
interlocutor that will be engaged in this thesis, it should also be noted that the Jewish scholar Daniel Boyarin also 
issued his own criticisms of Yoder’s thesis (along with his strong affirmation of the thesis). See Daniel Boyarin, 
“Judaism as a Free Church: Footnotes to John Howard Yoder's The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited,” 
CrossCurrents 56, no.4 (2007): 41-51. 
12
 Ochs’ statements regarding the four types of supersessionist claims that Yoder makes which I provide here are 
summarized from Ochs’ more recent work Another Reformation. They are, however, all present in JCSR. 
13
 Peter Ochs, Another Reformation, 160. 
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Jews such as Ochs reject on numerous grounds.14 Second, and building on the first claim, by 
locating the Old Testament precedent for Jesus’ particular political style in the prophet Jeremiah 
and Jeremiah’s vision for Israelite life in exile, Yoder claimed that exile is the normal state of 
Jewish existence.15 By doing so Yoder effectively made inconsequential those aspects of 
Jeremiah’s vision that also call for a return to the land. Third, Yoder’s appeal to pacifistic 
elements present in the Jewish tradition, such as in the Jeremiah tradition mentioned above, led 
him to suggest that Judaism is properly pacifist and advocates a total avoidance of the powers of 
statehood.16 Fourth, and finally, while Yoder presented his novel thesis as though it had potential 
for encouraging a new relationship of dialogue between Judaism and Christianity, he ended up 
setting up the terms for such a dialogue in advance through his Christian vision of “messianic 
Judaism” and not through a more basic proposal for scriptural common ground upon which to 
engage in mutual dialogue.17  
Since the publication of JCSR, there have been a few attempts, many if not most of them 
by non-Mennonites, to critically engage Yoder’s thesis in JCSR and reform key elements of it in 
ways that sought to avoid the pitfalls that Ochs identified therein.18 Few of them to my 
                                                          
14
 It is important to situate Ochs’ commentaries on Yoder’s work within the community of Jewish scholars variously 
known by the labels of “Textual Reasoner,” “post-liberal,” “post-Shoah,” and “post-critical.” Some of these labels 
will be attended to more in detail in chapter three. For now, it is enough to register the fact that during his 
commentaries, Ochs is explicit about the community that he speaks on behalf of, stating that he will “always 
respond from out of the movement of the post-liberal Jews who share in or support the approach of the Society for 
Textual Reasoning.” Ochs, “Commentary,” in JCSR, 38. 
15
 Ochs, Another Reformation, 160. 
16
 Ochs, Another Reformation, 161-162. 
17
 Ochs, Another Reformation, 162. 
18
 As indicated in footnote 11 above, Ochs himself has offered further reflections on Yoder since the initial 
publication of JCSR. See his The Free Church And Israel’s Covenant and Another Reformation. A number of 
Christian theologians have offered critical and constructive proposals which take up Yoder’s writings in JCSR in 
some way or another. See Alain Epp Weaver, States of Exile (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 2008) and Mapping Exile 
and Return (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014); C. Rosalee Velloso Ewell, “The Politics of Scripture: Exile and 
Identity In Jewish And Christian Readings Of Jeremiah,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 2003); 
Paul Martens, The Heterodox Yoder (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012); Tommy Givens, We The People: Israel 
And The Catholicity Of Jesus (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014). 
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knowledge, however, have made the attempt to do so by testing and expanding Ochs’ claims 
regarding Yoder’s supersessionism with reference to Yoder’s use of the restitutionist perspective 
on Christian history.19 As already hinted at above, Yoder is explicit about the importance of this 
perspective for his thesis in JCSR and yet these two elements to Yoder’s theology are rarely 
discussed together. The present inquiry aims to draw them together in order to argue that Yoder’s 
particular appropriation of the restitutionist perspective on Christian history, as a fundamental 
hermeneutic which he identifies as a Free Church vision, results in his supersessionist 
tendencies. I then argue that by critically re-evaluating Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic and 
subjecting it to the judgement of Ochs and several others, Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic can 
be reformed so as to leave behind the negative forms of supersessionism therein. These 
arguments will be achieved in four chapters.  
In the first chapter, I provide a brief but detailed account of supersessionism as a problem 
for Christian theology. If, as I will later argue, Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic does produce 
supersessionist tendencies, it will be necessary to establish a more complex understanding of 
what supersessionism is and how it functions in a Christian theological context. Through a 
summary of Kendall Soulen’s account of supersessionism as it has been operative in traditional 
and modern forms of Christian theology and his own constructive proposals for doing Christian 
theology without supersessionism, I set the stage for a critical reading of Yoder’s restitutionist 
hermeneutic. 
In the second chapter I turn to a critical evaluation of Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic, 
                                                          
19
 Exceptions here would be Michael G. Cartwright, “Editors’ Introduction,” in JCSR, 6-29 and Tommy Givens, 
Israel And The Catholicity Of Jesus. While Givens does not engage in Ochs’ work directly, he does note that Ochs’ 
influence on his book “is subtle but ubiquitous.” (xii) Also, the most recent publication of the latest The Journal of 
Scriptural Reasoning 13, no.2 (2014), which treats The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited specifically, has begun to 
fill in this gap with several insightful articles putting Yoder and Ochs’ thought into dialogue. 
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asking to what extent it replays or overcomes the kinds of supersessionism that were identified 
with Soulen’s help in chapter one. With reference to two of Yoder’s texts which explicitly treat 
his appropriation of the restitutionist perspective on Christian history, along with supporting 
texts found throughout his writings, I argue that Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic succumbs to a 
form of what Soulen identifies as “economic supersessionism.”  
Disclosing the roots of Yoder’s supersessionism through attention to his restitutionist 
hermeneutic, while a necessary first step, is on its own not enough to reveal recommendations 
for how Yoder’s theology might be reformed so as to avoid supersessionism. In the third chapter, 
I seek such recommendations through a treatment of Ochs’ own hermeneutical convictions as a 
pragmatic philosopher who is pursuing his own understanding of Jewish faithfulness after 
modernity. I make Ochs’ hermeneutical convictions evident through a broad reading of his 
scholarly corpus, including his critiques of Yoder. Before Ochs can helpfully provide 
recommendations for reforming Yoder’s hermeneutic, the deeper reasons why Ochs thinks 
Yoder is a supersessionist, and why he thinks Yoder’s supersessionism represents a problem for 
present day Jews like himself, need to be exposed. While it may seem obvious why Ochs would 
have a problem with Yoder’s supersessionism given that the general definition of 
supersessionism is that the Jews are to be considered rejected by God, it is nonetheless important 
to know why, in Ochs’ particular context, Yoder’s supersessionism is problematic.  
This type of contextualization has resulted in the third chapter having a distinctly 
biographical flavor to it. This is necessary as Ochs’ own distinct hermeneutical convictions 
require him to be discursively explicit about the communal basis for his own thinking. 
Throughout this chapter, I periodically draw Ochs’ critiques of Yoder in JCSR back into focus in 
order to show the foundation of Ochs’ criticisms. I end by arguing that Ochs’ criticisms of 
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Yoder, founded as they are on his hermeneutical convictions as a pragmatic philosopher, also 
suggest paths for repairing (Ochs’ term) or reforming Yoder’s theology in such a way as to make 
Yoderian theology without economic supersessionism possible. As an interpreter of Yoder and 
as a member of the Mennonite tradition of which Yoder was also a part, I see such a task as 
important. Thus, in the fourth and final chapter, I take up two critical components of Ochs’ 
pragmatic method and apply them to a final critical reading of Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic 
with the help of two authors with roots in the Mennonite tradition.  I then end with an alternate 
account of Yoder’s central thesis in JCSR, “it did not have to be,” which seeks to build on the 
positive dimensions of Yoder’s thesis while also incorporating some of the more suggestive 
trajectories in recent Christian theologies of Judaism and some of Ochs’ key methodological 
convictions. Through this alternate account, I suggest that Mennonite communities today might 
carry forward Yoder’s insights in a way that avoids his supersessionist tendencies through 
practices of scripture reading that are not pre-determined by ethical commitments such as 
pacifism. 
 
Terminology 
As will already have been noticed, I appeal variously throughout this thesis to 
restitutionist hermeneutics or to a restitutionist perspective on Christian history. To some, this 
perspective may be unfamiliar and so a brief description is warranted even if the later 
engagement with Yoder’s particular adaptation of this perspective will provide a broad definition 
of this perspective while also taking its own unique direction. In several of his studies on 
Anabaptism, the American Protestant scholar Franklin Littell consistently identified the theme of 
8 
 
die rechte Kirche, the true church, as a central defining principle to the theology and 
ecclesiology of the Anabaptists, a diverse group sometimes identified corporately as the “left 
wing of the reformation.”20 Littell notes how the theme of the true church arising among or 
coming out from a “fallen” or apostate church is by no means exclusive to Anabaptist thought 
but indeed runs throughout the Christian tradition as a whole, including the more explicit 
accounts of the nature of the fall and its cure during the Magisterial and Radical Reformations.21  
In the context of the Magisterial Reformation, however, Littell states that the notion of 
the true church was appealed to uniquely by Anabaptists in order to identify what they saw as the 
thoroughgoing apostasy of Christendom, not only as it was manifest in their own time but as 
they believed it to have been manifest ever since the fourth century when the fusion of church 
and state occurred in Constantine. For the Anabaptists, the apostasy of Christendom was 
characterized by how the church had diverged significantly, and in some accounts even 
completely fallen away, from the identity and calling that defined the church from its inception. 
This resulted in proposals for the restitution or recovery of a primitive foundation of the church, 
a heroic age, which had been abandoned or lost in a fall within historic Christian practice. These 
proposals were often quite diverse. Despite the diversity of the above uses of the concept of 
restitution, a central element that unites them all is the conviction that a primitive core of 
ecclesial faithfulness had at some point or points in time been lost and that that same core could 
be recovered only in the common life of committed believers who take the scriptures seriously as 
the sole authority of the Christian community.
                                                          
20
 Franklin Littell, The Anabaptist View of the Church (Boston: Star King Press, 1958), 79ff. The phrase “left wing 
of the Reformation” is often credited to Roland H. Bainton. See “The Left Wing of the Reformation,” The Journal 
of Religion 21, no.2 (1941):124-134. 
21
 Littell, The Anabaptist View of the Church, 48-55. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Christian Theology After Supersessionism  
   
 
 
Introduction 
On October 28th, 1965 Pope Paul VI proclaimed what was to become a historic 
declaration of the Catholic Church. The “Declaration On The Relation Of The Church To Non-
Christian Religions,” known more commonly by the Latin phrase which began the declaration, 
Nostra Aetate (“In our time…”), included a declaration on the Jewish people in its fourth section, 
stating that  
[a]lthough the Church is the new people of God, the Jews should not be presented as 
rejected or accursed by God, as if this followed from the Holy Scriptures…God holds the 
Jews most dear for the sake of their Fathers; He does not repent of the gifts He makes or 
of the calls He issues-such is the witness of the Apostle [Paul].1  
 
Taken within the context of Vatican II, the twenty-first ecumenical council of the Catholic 
Church, these statements were to be understood as part of the Church’s efforts to reform its 
teachings regarding and relationships toward the Jews in its own time. Previous teachings 
regarding the Jews had, for most of Christian history, maintained that the Jewish rejection of 
Jesus resulted in God’s rejection of the Jewish people as such, replacing them with the Church, 
the “new” people of God. In modern times, this doctrine has come to be known by many labels, 
the most common among them being “replacement theology” or “supersessionism.”  
The events of the Shoah (or Holocaust) led many in the worldwide Christian community 
                                                          
1
 “Declaration On The Relation Of The Church To Non-Christian Religions,” (1965), accessed May 19, 2015, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-
aetate_en.html. 
10 
 
to acknowledge the distinct connection between supersessionism and the anti-Semitism that 
fueled the persecution of the Jews throughout history. In charting new paths of faithfulness after 
the Holocaust, Christian communities have rightly moved to repudiate supersessionist teachings 
as they have persisted uniquely within the context of their own confessional communities. This 
has led to the widespread development of similar statements as those found in Nostra Aetate 
within a broad spectrum of Christian traditions.2 What is clear from statements like these is that 
the Christian church broadly understands its own efforts at reforming the church in the post-
Holocaust era to necessarily involve a reformation of the church’s attitude towards the Jews and 
Judaism. 
What is not immediately clear, however, in statements such as those found in Nostra 
Aetate is how Christians should interpret these new developments in Christian-Jewish relations 
theologically. What theological consequences follow from a rejection of supersessionism? What 
elements of traditional and modern theology result in supersessionism? How might such 
elements be reformed? These questions largely remain open ones today. As a result, some 
Christians, such as the German Roman Catholic theologian Hans Hermann Henrix, have 
acknowledged that “theology has not caught up with aspects of doctrinal statements and ecclesial 
documents on the relationship of the church with Jews and Judaism.”3 While Henrix is right to 
point out a general lack in the area of Christian theological reflection that seeks to reject 
supersessionism, there have nonetheless been noted attempts at such reflection that deserve 
                                                          
2
 For a comprehensive account of the various statements made by different Christian groups, see Bridges: 
Documents Of The Christian-Jewish Dialogue: The Road To Reconciliation, ed. Franklin Sherman, vol. 1, 1945-
1985 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2011) and Bridges: Documents Of The Christian-Jewish Dialogue: Building A 
New Relationship, ed. Franklin Sherman, vol. 2, 1986-2013 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2014). 
3
 Hans Hermann Henrix, “The Son Of God Became Human As A Jew: Implications Of The Jewishness Of Jesus For 
Christology,” in Christ Jesus And The Jewish People Today: New Explorations Of Theological Interrelationships 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 115. 
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attention. While many examples in this regard could be chosen, for the purposes of this thesis I 
examine one attempt as it appears in a groundbreaking work of theology by Kendall Soulen 
called The God of Israel and Christian Theology.4 Soulen’s work is helpful for the way it 
diagnoses three principle forms of supersessionism and their presence in traditional and modern 
forms of Christian theology. 
 
Supersessionism and the Christian Tradition: An Exposition of Three Forms 
In the introduction to his book, Kendall Soulen notes that he will address two important 
questions: “how deeply is supersessionism implicated in the traditional fabric of Christian 
theology? And how can Christians read the Bible and articulate their most basic convictions in 
ways that are not supersessionist? In short, how can Christians be really Christian without being 
triumphalist toward Jews?”5 While Soulen’s answers to the latter question are important and will 
be briefly attended to throughout, for the purposes of the present chapter, I focus mainly on his 
answers to the first question. Soulen suggests that supersessionism is indeed implicated deeply in 
the traditional fabric of Christian theology and that it can be identified in three different forms. 
Those three forms go by the labels “economic,” “punitive,” and “structural,” and will now be 
defined in sequence as they appear in Soulen’s work. 
 First, Soulen defines “economic” supersessionism as the teaching that “the ultimate 
obsolescence of carnal Israel is an essential feature of God’s one overarching economy of 
                                                          
4
 Kendall Soulen, The God Of Israel And Christian Theology (Minneapolis, Fortress, 1999). One other notable 
author to mention here is Paul M. Van Buren whose trilogy, A Theology of the Jewish Christian Reality, 3 vols. 
(New York: Seabury, 1980-83; San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), set new standards for thinking about a 
Christian theology of Judaism. 
5
 Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology, x. 
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redemption for the world.”6 In this vein, Soulen demonstrates how theologians of modernity such 
as Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schleiermacher argued that Christianity’s split from Judaism 
was necessary so as to emancipate itself from the limits and particularities of a fleshly people. 
For Kant, Soulen argues, “Christian doctrine simply is the story of the triumph of creaturely-
universal spirit over historical-particular flesh.”7 Similarly, for Schleiermacher, Jesus represented 
a wholly new “religious consciousness” that contained no continuity with Judaism.8 In other 
words, for both Kant and Schleiermacher, carnal (fleshly) Israel was at best a means to an end or 
an unfortunate layover on the way to the true destination which was Christ. After Christ, 
however, carnal Israel no longer served a purpose, as all that mattered now was the spiritual 
transformation that Christ brought to the whole world. 
 Soulen goes on to note how, although great strides have been made in more recent 
Christian theology to move beyond forms of economic supersessionism such as are evident in 
Kant and Schleiermacher, it is still latent therein. To demonstrate this, Soulen turns to the work 
of the Reformed theologian Karl Barth and the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. For the sake of 
space, I will only briefly account for Soulen’s treatment of Barth. Soulen argues that Barth 
helpfully moves beyond some of the operations internal to the supersessionism evident in Kant 
and Schleiermacher by drawing out the importance of the theme of covenant throughout the 
scriptures.9 God’s covenant with the fleshly people of Israel is precisely, for Barth, the way by 
which God aims to achieve his work of “consummation” in the created order and that covenant is 
“eternal.”10 God does not covenant with Israel as a temporary means to address the problem of 
                                                          
6
 Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology, 29. 
7
 Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology, 68. 
8
 Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology, 71. 
9
 Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology, 83. 
10
 Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology, 87. 
13 
 
sin in the world. Rather, God originally covenants with Israel as a means to achieve God’s 
gracious intent for creation as a whole and does so before any particular account of sin even 
enters the picture.  
According to Soulen, however, due to his decisive Christological starting point, Barth 
still upholds a form of economic supersessionism by locating God’s covenant with Israel in a 
prior covenant with Himself in the election of Jesus Christ. Once Jesus appears in human history 
as the fulfillment of God’s redemptive and consummative plan for history, “Israel’s distinctive 
role comes to an end in principle, and it is taken place by the church.”11 Thus, while God’s 
covenant with Israel is not seen in negative terms, it still ultimately ends up being superseded by 
the Church as “…[Israel’s] mission as a natural community has now run its course.”12 Soulen 
wonders whether or not Barth (and Rahner) might have avoided economic supersessionism by 
“exploring the possibility that God’s work as Consummator engages creation in the total, open-
ended, and still ongoing history that unfolds between the Lord, Israel, and the nations.”13 In other 
words, rather than draw Israel’s history to a close in Christ, might that history have carried 
forward in its own way? Soulen himself makes a helpful proposal in this regard. Jesus enters 
time not as the fulfillment and so end of Israel’s history but rather as  
the carnal embodiment of God’s end-time fidelity toward Israel and toward Israel’s future 
as the place of unsurpassable blessing for Israel, for the nations, and for all creation. By 
its nature…Jesus’ resurrection from the dead anticipates a future event whose character 
as victorious fidelity can no longer be in doubt.14 
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In other words, Jesus’ resurrection carries history forward in the light of a new act of God that 
confirms that God will fulfill his original gracious and consummative intent in covenanting with 
Israel and through Israel, the nations. From this perspective, the church becomes not the new 
people of God in the sense that they replace an old people, but in the sense that they represent a 
new act of God to create a community of “table fellowship” between Jews and Gentiles, a 
definitive sign that God’s blessing will overcome the curse in the course of a history ravaged by 
violence and division.15 Israel of the flesh is thus, for Soulen, never abandoned or superseded by 
the Lord. While more could be said regarding the helpful dimensions to Soulen’s proposal, his 
treatment of other forms of supersessionism must also be attended to. 
 The second form of supersessionism that Soulen identifies is “punitive” supersessionism, 
which is the teaching that “…[b]ecause the Jews obstinately reject God’s action in Christ, God in 
turn angrily rejects and punishes the Jews.”16 Soulen notes that because punitive supersessionism 
is less difficult to identify it is in some ways less problematic when compared with the 
sometimes insidious nature of economic supersessionism. Soulen identifies the early Christian 
apologete Justin Martyr as exemplifying punitive supersessionism in his Dialogue With Trypho. 
There, in an outrageous interpretive move, Justin claims that God gave Israel the Mosaic Law, 
with its ordination of circumcision, as a form of punishment, singling out as it does in a visible 
way the Jews as the people “who crucified Christ.”17 Soulen finds no particular need to provide a 
proposal for moving beyond punitive supersessionism as, of all the three forms he treats it is the 
most crude. As a result, Soulen believes it can be dispensed with in crude fashion. Soulen’s 
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primary concerns are with economic and structural forms of supersessionism. This latter form 
must now also be summarized. 
 For Soulen, economic and punitive supersessionism are only possible on the basis of a 
more foundational form of supersessionism that serves as their inner logic. Structural 
supersessionism, for Soulen, is a particular way of conceiving of the unity of the biblical canon, 
what he calls “the “standard canonical narrative,” as a four part story of creation, fall, 
redemption, and final consummation.18 In structural supersessionism, God’s intent in creating 
humanity for the purposes of consummating the created order is construed in terms of a universal 
human call, such that the vocation of humanity is understandable apart from a particular calling 
of the people of Israel. 
Furthermore, the creation of humanity for this calling is quickly overshadowed by the 
problematic of the first parents’ fall.19 At this point, all that comes to dominate the rest of the Old 
Testament is the dialectic between the fall and a hoped for redemption that has not yet come. In 
this dialectic, Israel functions to foreshadow the redemption that Christ will bring rather than as 
ongoing partners in a covenant between God and Israel characterized by God’s calling Israel to 
continually participate in the divine work of consummation in the created order. By virtue of the 
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dominance of the fall on this telling of the narrative, Genesis 1-3 become functionally the only 
significant Hebrew Scriptures needed to tell the story and the rest of Israel’s history becomes 
inconsequential.20 Once Christ comes by the time of the New Testament, the resolution of the 
fall is achieved and Israel, as a people, is no longer needed. The resolution of the story is 
achieved and will be brought to a final close at the return of Christ. For Soulen, then, the 
principle problem with structural supersessionism is how it “unifies the Christian canon in a 
manner that renders the Hebrew Scriptures largely indecisive for shaping conclusions about how 
God’s purposes engage creation in universal and enduring ways.”21 
What structural supersessionism relies upon at its core is an assumption that the 
scriptures should be read from the beginning to the end as a story arced toward the event of the 
incarnation. The incarnation, in structural supersessionism, is the key to the whole of the 
scriptural witness’ meaning. Soulen’s own proposal is to advocate for a different key. Rather 
than make the incarnation the key, Soulen advocates that “the reign of God” be understood as the 
central interpretive and hermeneutical key to unify the scriptures.22 The reign of God is helpful, 
for Soulen, because it allows for the decisiveness of Christ’s death and resurrection as a 
definitive act in history whereby God demonstrates fidelity to Israel and the nations as Lord, but 
does so without making that act the meaning of the whole of the scriptures themselves. Thus, 
Soulen states with regards to the unity of the biblical canon that, “…[w]ithout doubt evertything 
turns on Christ, but not everything concerns Christ.”23 
 
Conclusion 
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Soulen’s analysis of the three forms of supersessionism at work in traditional and modern 
forms of theology is helpful for providing a basic grid by which to evaluate many forms of 
Christian theology as replaying or avoiding supersessionist tendencies. In engaging any 
particular author of Christian theology, the question can be put to them whether or not any 
particular aspect to their theology encourages an ongoing and open-ended role for Israel within 
the plan of God or whether such a role is shown to be, either formally or functionally, obsolete. 
This question will now be put to Yoder through an analysis of his restitutionist hermeneutic.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Restitutionist Hermeneutics: A Supersessionist Vision?  
 
 
Introduction 
 The primary claim of this chapter is that John Howard Yoder’s use of the restitutionist 
perspective on Christian history, which I argue functions as a fundamental hermeneutic operative 
in his writings, ends up producing a form of what Kendall Soulen identified as economic 
supersessionism. To make this claim on the basis of Yoder’s hermeneutic in particular may 
appear to some interpreters of Yoder as misguided from the beginning. It is common when 
treating Yoder’s broad and diverse writings to make some kind of clarifying comments about 
how Yoder should not be pigeonholed into one methodology or hermeneutic framework. Thus, 
to claim that Yoder has consistently utilized the restitutionist perspective as a theologically 
relevant hermeneutic (and perhaps even method) might sound, to some interpreters of Yoder, too 
much like pigeonholing him.  
Interpreters of Yoder such as Mark Thiessen Nation laud Yoder for refusing to write 
systematically, and yet what is curious is Nation’s equal desire to laud Yoder’s “relentless” 
consistency.1 If Yoder was an occasional theologian who rejected “methodologism” in favor of 
working without an overarching theological system and yet was “relentlessly consistent,” on 
what basis or center can he be judged consistent?2 There are others such as Paul Martens who are 
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19 
 
not convinced that Yoder’s work displays such consistency but rather that Yoder develops his 
thought in problematic ways that could be understood as “heterodox.”3  
Stanley Hauerwas has provided a more nuanced perspective, noting that, for Yoder, 
“Jesus is central…but since Jesus is the Son of God, that means he is the center that cannot be 
summarized, because Jesus makes a difference for how everything is understood.” 4 Yet this 
statement, as was shown above with Soulen’s analysis of supersessionism, only begs larger 
questions about what is all wrapped up in the phrase “makes a difference for how everything is 
understood.” While Hauerwas’ comment gets closer to the truth than those who wish to write off 
any definitive framework or system to Yoder’s work, how to communicate Jesus’ meaning 
correctly and consistently on the basis of the scriptures is indeed Yoder’s goal.  
As will be shown below, a correct vision of Jesus, for Yoder, is made possible through a 
restitutionist hermeneutic. If this hermeneutic is not to be called a system, then at the very least, 
as Yoder himself contends, it should be viewed as a consistent pattern of thought he utilizes for 
describing his vision of the significance of Jesus such that it could be useful for testing in 
“ordinary language.”5 Some may still object arguing, as Craig Carter does, that Yoder’s vision of 
Jesus springs from his reforming efforts and that he is therefore “not a restitutionist.”6 While 
Carter is right to call Yoder a reformer, he is wrong to suggest that, for Yoder, being a reformer 
precludes being a restitutionist.  This is so because for Yoder, the restitutionists that he took his 
cue from, the “ecclesial Anabaptists,” were true reformers.7 By taking up the restitutionist 
perspective of the ecclesial Anabaptists, Yoder thus presents his role as a reformer as founded 
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upon a particular performance of the restitutionist hermeneutic as hermeneutics of reform. Carter 
is thus right if the “restitutionist” he imagines is a rampant sectarian who claims to be recreating 
Eden, but then he would have done better to clarify the sense in which he appeals to the term. 
The distinction, in other words, need not be made in the way Carter makes it. Thus, while there is 
no doubt that Yoder himself would have been suspicious of any aspect of his theology becoming 
“a law unto itself,” he no doubt wanted his vision of Jesus to be received as a skilled attempt at 
providing resources for the church to defend against what he saw were incorrect visions of 
Jesus.8 It should thus be no scandal to claim that the restitutionist perspective, which Yoder 
elsewhere calls a “mental structure,” was a considerable feature of his own theology.9  
The first part of this chapter begins by briefly locating the restitutionist perspective on 
Christian history within the context of the Reformation and Radical Reformation since this is the 
foundational context that informs Yoder’s particular engagement with and adaptation of the 
restitutionist hermeneutic. I then turn directly to an analysis of Yoder’s appropriation and use of 
restitutionist hermeneutics in one key essay, “Anabaptism and History,” from his book The 
Priestly Kingdom. The key question asked throughout that analysis is what the principle elements 
are to Yoder’s adaptation of the restitutionist hermeneutic, and to what extent they replay any of 
the three forms of supersessionism Soulen identified.  
However, since in “Anabaptism and History” Yoder is not treating the question of the 
relationship between Judaism and Christianity at all but rather the question of the church’s 
authoritative criterion for reform, the linkage between his adaptation of restitutionist 
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hermeneutics and supersessionism will not be initially obvious. However, as will become clear 
throughout the chapter, for Yoder the restitutionist hermeneutic is just as much a hermeneutic for 
evaluating the history attested to throughout the scriptures (such as Israel’s history) as it is a 
hermeneutic for evaluating history outside of the scriptures (Church history). This latter point 
will become particularly clear in the second part of the chapter, when I turn to the text “The 
Restitution of the Church,” in JCSR, in order to test Yoder’s claim that restitutionist 
hermeneutics can represent a Jewish vision of (or hermeneutic for evaluating) history. I end by 
arguing that two dimensions to the restitutionist hermeneutic, the appeal to the ‘fall’ of the 
church and the ‘radical renewal’ of the church produce supersessionist tendencies in Yoder’s 
theology. 
 
Reformation and Radical Reformation: Restitution of the ‘True’ Body 
 
Ave Verum Corpus! This Latin phrase, which begins the Eucharistic prayer attributed to 
Pope Innocent VI (1352-62) and which would come to be beautifully composed by Mozart 
centuries later, in many ways encapsulates the controversy that was at the heart of the 
Reformation.10 Where is the “true body” of the faithful? For the Anabaptists of the Radical 
Reformation, the true body was not to be found in the established churches of the day, especially 
not in their Eucharistic celebrations.11 For this reason, it had to be sought elsewhere. The 
prominent use of the biblical metaphor of “the whore of Babylon” in Anabaptist writings 
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illustrates this with provocative clarity.12 Pertinent here especially is Pilgram Marpeck’s tract 
The Uncovering of the Babylonian Whore.13 In this tract, Marpeck uses the image from 
Revelation to refer to the Roman Catholic Church stating, “We speak, as can be seen, of the old, 
red, Roman whore (who passed herself off for so long as the bride of Christ, deceiving herself 
and many with her). This whore [sic] the real bride of Christ--the bride consisting of a new 
people, married to Christ through his blood and suffering--has thrown out and rejected with all 
her tricks.”14 For Marpeck, the old body, uncovered and exposed as false, must go and the new, 
true body must be put in her place. Serving the true body meant throwing out a body that had, for 
so long, been the supposedly false bearer of Christ’s body. 
A lot has changed since the tumultuous times in which Marpeck and other Anabaptist 
leaders declared their faith in opposition to what they saw so clearly as a false church. For some 
time now Mennonites, and particularly Mennonite historians, have noted that appeals to stark 
distinctions between the true church and the false churches as were common in the Reformation 
era are, while perhaps understandable then given the circumstances, finally unhelpful for any 
long term use today. Furthermore, the historical records show how Free Church traditions such 
as the Mennonites have, from their earliest beginnings, maintained significant lines of continuity 
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with the greater church traditions that some of the earliest Radicals readily identified as false.15 
Opposing idealistic depictions of Free Church traditions such as the Anabaptists, Mennonite 
historians have also demonstrated the fallibility of Anabaptist communities, both in their genesis 
and in their growth and development into numerous tradition-forms.  
This has led many to acknowledge the basic point that Christian faithfulness, regardless 
of the tradition in question, can never be achieved apart from the complexity, diversity, and 
indeed the “spots” and “wrinkles” of flesh and blood Christian communities such as are evident 
in all the traditions of the church.16 This more realistic and humble self-awareness on the part of 
many Mennonites has in turn contributed to a growing desire to re-establish connections between 
Free Churches and the great traditions of the church catholic. Almost five hundred years have 
passed since the Reformation began and many within the Mennonite community have begun to 
question the ongoing relevance of the ecclesial divisions which were a result of that tumultuous 
time.17 
Yet, among these more moderate Mennonite voices, John Howard Yoder continued to 
argue that in spite of the clear evidence of fallibility in Mennonite history, there was something 
to the basic logic that Marpeck expressed so long ago that was still needed by the church in order 
to keep her from assuming a false body. In fact, Yoder argued, the only way to be serious about 
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history as a contingent sphere of human action and decision was to be willing to be radically 
critical of the various church forms that had been operative throughout history right up until his 
own time. Yoder identified this perspective as “restitutionist,” differentiated it from the closely 
related term “reform” and described it as a useful “though pattern” for churches that are seeking 
renewal in any given age.18 Yoder’s use of the restitutionist perspective has been met both with 
praise as well as continual criticisms by many historians and theologians.19 In his own time, 
Yoder did not shy away from debate over the usefulness of the restitutionist perspective either. 
This is particularly clear in one text of Yoder’s which will now be examined. 
 
Restitutionist Hermeneutics in Three Movements 
 
In his essay “Anabaptism and History,” Yoder describes what he says are the three 
“movements” to the restitutionist thought pattern or view of history. These three movements will 
be immediately recognizable as having formal similarities with what Soulen identified as the 
standard canonical narrative: “There was once a normative state of the church. There was a 
‘Fall,’ leaving a degenerate state, so intrinsically deteriorated as not to be reparable without 
discontinuity. Then there is the radical renewal.”20 Yoder claimed that this pattern is essentially 
“catholic,” having been appealed to commonly, not only by (some) Catholics and Protestants, but 
also by “most historically oriented religions.”21  
In other words, for Yoder, most Christian traditions give an account of the church’s 
normative beginnings that set the standard for evaluating future development. As a result, most 
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traditions also have a sense of what abandoning that normative beginning might look like and the 
effect(s) that such an act might have. Finally, most traditions have a sense of what it might take 
to get back on the right track. The pattern is thus not peculiar to any given tradition, only specific 
uses and adaptations of the pattern are. This gets again at Yoder’s earlier point, namely, that the 
term restitution does not refer to a concept peculiar to Anabaptists or the Free Churches, rather is 
it a pattern of thinking internal to Christian discourse. The question to be explored below, 
however, is whether this pattern of thinking is itself productive of supersessionist tendencies or 
inimical to them. 
 
The First Movement: The Normative State 
Yoder begins his account of the first movement of the restitutionist thought pattern, the 
“normative state” of the Church, by distinguishing it from what he sees as “fringe” versions that 
express a longing for an ideal church.22 For Yoder, articulating a vision of the normative state of 
the church in any time is risky because such an articulation is itself an act of ascribing or 
establishing authority, either in an idealized past or in an “unaccountable Spirit or kingdom.”23 
Since Yoder wishes to avoid these latter options, he locates the church’s normative state not in 
terms of ideal human structures and practices that can be defined in general terms, but rather in 
terms set by particular acts of divine rule in history. For Yoder, the church’s normative state 
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consists in its submission to the rule of God, as it was definitively made manifest in the event of 
the incarnation and since then as it is continually made manifest through the power of the Holy 
Spirit. 
For Yoder, defining normativity finally in terms of anything but the incarnation is 
problematic because of how such definitions limit the church’s accountability to within the 
bounds set by a particular church tradition’s structures or language. Yoder is aware, however, 
that his appeal to the incarnation, on its own, only evades the more difficult but always necessary 
task of defining how the incarnation should be normative for the church in a given age.24 In turn, 
Yoder offers his answer to this question by unpacking what he feels is “the meaning of 
Incarnation.”25 
For Yoder, the meaning of incarnation is, simply put, defined by the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth, whose particular obedience attested to in the New Testament demonstrates the way 
God wants his people to live in the midst of “pluralistic and relativistic” reality.26 Jesus’ 
incarnation, witnessed to in the scriptures, is the act of “God’s reaching into human reality to say 
what we must do and what we must leave behind.”27 More than that though, by virtue of Christ’s 
resurrection and ascension, Jesus’ incarnation is also definitively “the Rule of God.”28 In this 
way, the incarnation is normative in a way that no other reference point can be.  
Yet the striking dimension to this norm of the church is that it is nonetheless found at “a 
point within history.”29 Precisely in Jesus’ particularity as a human being -- his openness to being 
encountered as a singular and unique historical agent whose meaning nonetheless extends, 
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through the power of the Holy Spirit, before and beyond his own context --is his life normative 
for the church. What Jesus, as incarnate Lord, means therefore, can only be decided in particular 
times and places as that meaning itself is established or incarnated anew in people who have 
learned to “do” what Jesus did.30 
The logical question following upon these affirmations, however, is if people are to learn 
how to do what Jesus did but are not to rely on the authority of a particular tradition in order to 
achieve such learning, how is it that the normative message of Jesus’ incarnation is 
communicated across time and space so as to be accepted (or rejected) as the church’s norm? If 
the bounds set by a particular church tradition’s structures or language are not to be finally 
trusted as reliable vehicles of transmission for that message, how is the Spirit is at work 
‘translating’ Jesus’ meaning into new contexts? These questions are crucial because it is 
precisely at this point that Yoder needs to show how his position does not require that the 
‘meaning’ of the incarnation be co-equal with or dependent upon the particular ‘path’ taken by 
the church in history. For if the meaning of the incarnation is somehow possessed by the church 
then the church, according to Yoder, is no longer accountable to an authority beyond the bounds 
of tradition. 
For Yoder, the translation of Jesus’ meaning is achieved through the canon, which must 
be understood as having two senses. First, canon is “testimony” (scripture) to the “saving events 
of human history” that have direct relevance for all history.31 This first sense of canon, as 
testimony, is never to be understood as a source of authoritative propositions regarding Jesus’ 
meaning. For Yoder, the translation of Jesus’ normative humanity into new times and places is 
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possible because the early followers of Jesus took steps to ensure that the founding memories of 
the church were passed down in the form or rule of scripture as a canon of authoritative writings, 
or what Yoder elsewhere calls “the collective scribal memory, the store par excellence of 
treasures old and new.”32   
Here Yoder seems to recognize the real mediating function of “agents of memory” in the 
community of faith without which the Gospel would not be transmitted.33 An agent of memory 
“remembers expertly, charismatically the store of memorable, identity-confirming acts of 
faithfulness praised and of failure repented.”34 Even in this case, though, the agents of memory 
and the community in which these agents serve, are never judging or deciding the meaning of 
Jesus and the calling of the church (the saving events) themselves. That is a perpetual task for 
each community in each age. Thus, while canon in this first sense is linked to the body of people 
who over time continue to transmit these memories, the memories and particularly the definition 
of the memories are themselves always independent of the body that transmits them; the meaning 
of Jesus remains independent of any particular tradition. 
Beyond canon just being authoritative writings, then, there is a sense in which canon 
more formally represents the “norming authority” of the church.35 This sense of canon refers to 
the deferral of a community’s authority to an “objective history” that stands in judgment of any 
particular appropriation of that history. This leads Yoder to elsewhere make the particularly 
provocative claim that the canon, rather than giving the church a “handle on history,” leaves the 
church squarely within  
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the continuing uncertainty of life within history, the arbitrariness and the particularity of 
all historical existence, and the arbitrariness and particularity of hermeneutics within 
history, which is precisely where we ought to be, since that is where God chose to be 
revealed in all the arbitrariness and particularity of Abraham and Sarah, Moses and 
Miriam, Jeremiah, Jesus and Pentecost, Luke and Paul, Peter and John.36 
 
Provocatively, Yoder thus asserts that the normative state of the church is a state of contingent 
existence in which there is no specific “rhyme or reason” to why particular people are chosen as 
participants and witnesses to the reign of God in history. Abraham and Sarah, Moses and 
Miriam, Jeremiah, Jesus and Pentecost, Luke and Paul, Peter and John are all particular historical 
agents whom by themselves carry no natural qualities or capacities that would make them 
capable of participating in or witnessing to the reign of God. The fact that they can is only a 
result of God’s choice. This is, in a sense then, what the meaning of the incarnation is. 
Incarnation means that God chooses particular people, but does so in a contingent sphere of 
human activity in which those same people do not, by virtue of God’s choice, come to then be 
authoritative agents of God’s reign. Instead of becoming agents of God’s reign, they are to 
remain obedient subjects.  
 Yoder’s emphasis on God’s choice here is one of the few times that Yoder comes close to 
discussing the topic of divine election. God’s choice is supremely here an act of the rule or reign 
of God; no choice of any of the aforementioned figures determined or elected God. Rather, God 
elected these individuals to participate in and witness to the reign of God. The key question to 
attend to here in light of the statements of Nostra Aetate and Soulen’s analysis of 
supersessionism is to what extent God’s choice, once made, is revocable.  
On the basis of Yoder’s worries about ascribing normativity to any particular church 
tradition’s institutional structures or language, one might surmise that Yoder would, in a sense, 
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remain agnostic on this question. It is conceivable that God might irrevocably choose to be 
represented by one particular people in time and in history but it is also conceivable that God 
might choose to be so represented only for a time. To make a judgment one way or another is, in 
a sense, saying too much. Thus, Yoder notes in one other rare instance in which he treats this 
question, that “[b]oth views [irrevocable/revocable] are true, dialectically.”37 In relation to the 
church, then, no particular tradition is ever in a place in which they can assume that God has put 
the divine stamp of approval on the particularities of their existence. A particular church tradition 
may be witnessing to the reign of God, but they may also be the enemies of that reign. The first 
movement of the restitutionist hermeneutic thus acts to relativize all church traditions’ claims to 
authority by ascribing ultimate authority to the reign of God as attested to definitively in the 
incarnation.  
Having briefly treated Yoder’s particular appropriation of the first movement of a 
restitutionist perspective on Christian history, how might it be evaluated in light of Soulen’s 
analysis of supersessionism? Particularly, how might Yoder’s particular understanding of the 
incarnation as the hermeneutical key of the scriptures be evaluated? Yoder is explicit that one of 
the key features of the restitutionist perspective is its move to “identify within Scripture its 
baseline, especially with regard to the relationship of the Testaments.”38 On the one hand, 
Yoder’s identification of the incarnation as the restitutionist “baseline” evades the problematic of 
economic and structural supersessionism by joining Soulen in naming the reign of God as the 
hermeneutic key of the scriptures. Abraham and Sarah, Moses and Miriam, Jeremiah, Jesus and 
Pentecost, Luke and Paul, Peter and John are all particular figures and events within Israel and 
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the Church’s history that represent the church’s hermeneutic baseline as they all say something 
definitive about the reign of God as it takes on flesh in particular people and places. Specifically, 
they attest to the supremacy of the divine election.  
Thus, the proper scriptural hermeneutic of the church is not achieved through reading the 
Old Testament from the perspective of the New in order to highlight their difference. Rather, the 
right hermeneutical approach to the unity of the Old and New Testament is to see them under the 
one reign of God. So far this perspective would seem to be in accord with Soulen’s own 
constructive proposal for moving beyond supersessionist accounts of the unity of the scriptures. 
The scriptures, for Yoder, do not find their hermeneutical key in Christ as the figure who 
provides closure and resolution to an otherwise open-ended story. Rather, the incarnation 
heightens and intensifies history’s contingent character as a sphere in which the reign of God is 
visibly active as an ongoing dynamic in history. With Yoder, however, the pivotal caveat in this 
account is that Jesus Christ, while simultaneously continuous with all those other figures, is also 
the reign of God in the flesh. None of the other figures can be ascribed this status. Does this 
move effectively undermine what is otherwise a non-supersessionist approach to unifying the 
scriptures under the norm of the reign of God?  
Not necessarily, as what is still left uncertain is what particular impact Jesus’ incarnation, 
as the reign of God, has on the nature or vocation of the people of God. If Christ appears as the 
reign of God in history but does not in some way resolve history, then it is conceivable that Israel 
and her scriptures, as a testimony to the events in history which display the reign of God, would 
continue to have a significant role in revealing how the reign of God is operative in history in 
ongoing ways. That being said, the fact that Yoder equates the reign of God with the particular 
person of Jesus Christ does open up a door through which a structurally supersessionist 
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hermeneutic could enter. For, if the definition of the nature of peoplehood achieves its apex in 
Christ, then what came before will always be a subordinate example of earlier and less precise, 
yet nonetheless real, definitions of peoplehood under the reign of God.39  
However, must holding to a high view of Christ’s significance for interpreting the 
scriptures and for defining the nature of peoplehood imply a crude supersessionism of any of the 
three varieties that Soulen mentioned? Soulen himself has recently said otherwise. Since the 
publication of The God of Israel and Christian Theology, he has gone on to develop and change 
his thoughts regarding the usefulness of his own proposal. In a recent essay, Soulen notes, “I am 
no longer satisfied with some of the things I wrote...Basically, I failed to give Christology and 
the doctrine of the Trinity a central and constitutive place in my canonical narrative.”40 
Furthermore, Soulen notes, “I no longer think that supersessionism is an essential or necessary 
feature of the standard canonical narrative.”41 Instead, Soulen proposes that the narrative is still 
helpful and that what needs to be addressed instead is the “deformation of that narrative.”42 
Soulen’s more recent proposals for what that deformation consists of and how it can be 
addressed have led him to focus on the continuity of “the canon’s cumulative witness to the 
Tetragrammaton, the sacred and unspoken name of God.”43  
While space does not permit a full analysis of Soulen on this score, what is important to 
highlight in this shift in Soulen’s thinking is his realization that, within the standard narrative, 
one can find resources for achieving the ongoing significance of Israel and her scriptures along 
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with traditional Christian claims regarding Christ. The Tetragrammaton is helpful here because 
the sacred and unspoken name of God remains sacred and unspoken in the New Testament, even 
after Christ’s resurrection and ascension.44 Thus, whatever it means to speak the name of Jesus 
as a testimony to the reign of God, God’s identity as professed by Israel in the Tetragrammaton 
remains along with or as constitutive of that testimony. Furthermore, even if Christians confess 
that Jesus is Lord and that it is in him that we truly see the reign of God, no one Christian can 
have immediate access to the meaning of the incarnation in any final sense and for this reason 
Christians have no recourse to claiming that Jesus’ Lordship somehow usurps the endurance of 
God’s promises to Israel.  
Thus, while the Christian confession may imply at least some form of supersessionism in 
a minimal sense, this need not imply that Israel’s unique covenant with God at Sinai has been 
superseded.  Christians really must confess that Jesus has brought something superior to all that 
had come before or would come after. In response, however, Christians have a choice between 
two kinds of supersessionism. Here a different account of the forms of Christian supersessionism 
is helpful to introduce.  
The Jewish philosopher David Novak has made the claim that there are two kinds of 
supersessionism, a “hard” supersessionism and a “soft” supersessionism.45  “Hard” 
supersessionism claims that Christians are the inheritors of Jesus’ new covenant and that Israel’s 
covenant has been abrogated. In hard supersessionism, it would be difficult to see how any 
feature of Israel’s life could have enduring significance (including the sacred name of God). 
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Novak’s account of hard supersessionism would thus accord with Soulen’s account of economic 
and punitive supersessionism. There is, however, also a “soft” supersessionism. Soft 
supersessionism claims that although Jesus did fulfill Israel’s promises, there is an enduring (and 
mysterious) way in which Israel and the Church remain together as distinct covenant partners 
with the one God of Israel. Novak’s own convictions regarding what makes for legitimate 
Jewish-Christian dialogue leads him to claim that “Christianity must be generically 
supersessionist. In fact, I question the Christian orthodoxy of any Christian who claims he or she 
is not a supersessionist at all.”46 Here is where one might say that Novak’s statements and 
Soulen’s original proposal regarding “structural” supersessionism part ways. Novak believes that 
Christians should uphold some form of supersessionism in order to be true to their faith 
commitments. 
In light of the above analysis of the first movement of Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic, 
it can be stated that Yoder’s desire to seek the normative definition of peoplehood in the 
incarnation of Christ does not necessitate a “hard” supersessionism per se. Israel and Israel’s 
scriptures, for Yoder, can still testify to the reign of God in enduring ways after Christ as Jesus’ 
reign is continuous with the reign of God as it had already been present in the old covenant. If 
the first movement of Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic does not necessarily result in a hard 
supersessionism, can the same be said of the other two movements? 
 
The Second Movement: The Fall 
For Yoder, the fall of the church occurs when the church chooses to establish its own 
reign or kingdom as a self-legitimating authority. By virtue of doing this, it essentially abandons 
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accountability to the norm of the incarnation. Once this has happened, the church, is left in “a 
degenerate state, so intrinsically deteriorated as not to be reparable without discontinuity.”47 Here 
Yoder introduces significant terms such as “degenerate,” “deteriorated,” and “discontinuity.” 
Each of these terms carries a potential range which will once again be necessary for Yoder to 
specify.  
In Yoder’s own appropriation of this second movement, he will want to distinguish 
himself from those Radical Reformation figures that took this movement to the extreme by 
abandoning the mainstream churches for a church of their own ideological making. For example, 
his problem with the radicals at Münster was that they replaced a “mainstream church” that was 
accountable only to itself with a “clandestine” church that was only accountable to itself.48  For 
this reason, Yoder claims that the call for “discontinuity” with a fallen church is not necessarily a 
recommendation of discontinuity with all previous traditions of the church (i.e. the church’s 
proclamation expressed diversely throughout history). Indeed, in his dissertation, Yoder made 
what might be a surprising claim to some readers that “Anabaptism did not wish to have a centre 
that it held ‘for itself.’”49 Having begun to understand the importance of Yoder’s account of 
normativity, however, one can see why Yoder would want this to be the case. If Anabaptism had 
a center for itself, it would no longer be accountable to Christ as Lord. 
Nonetheless, for Yoder, Anabaptism did end up becoming its own unique tradition 
separate from the mainstream churches due to the “failure of the official Reformation churches” 
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to engage in “a truly fraternal polemic.”50 Here one sees Yoder arguing that amidst the diverse 
ways restitution could function as a thought pattern, it need not be seen as an inherently purist or 
sectarian way of evaluating history or performing obedient discipleship. In the context of the 
Radical Reformation, “the Anabaptists,” claimed Yoder, “did not reject the present for its failure 
to be Eden…”51 The problem, according to Yoder, that the Anabaptists addressed, was not the 
lack of a total perfection within the church and not even necessarily false teachings per se but 
instead “one particular set of decisions, accepted by the churches at large in the fourth century, 
symbolized by Constantine…” that would for a great period of time change the social shape of 
the church.52  
Yoder describes this “set of decisions” in various ways throughout his writings. Almost 
all of them, however, can be captured by what Yoder calls the decision to assume the 
indefectibility of the church. Indefectibility, for Yoder, can be summarized as the church’s claim 
to secure its own success in the world through the powers and structures of human institutions. 
Constantine is the primary symbol that Yoder appeals to when discussing indefectibility as, with 
Constantine, trust in the invisible Lordship of Christ (the reign of God) was replaced or else 
subsumed under the banner of a visible empire as the guarantor of God’s governance of history.53  
While Constantine is no doubt the symbol of the church’s decision to assume 
indefectibility, for Yoder, it is indefectibility as itself a false thought pattern (which Yoder labels 
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“Constantinianism”)54 that defines the fall of the church in any given time. Where restitution 
recognizes the reign of God in the incarnation as the authority which is independent of and 
external from the church (or any power), indefectibility establishes authority within the church as 
an institution, which in the context of the Catholic church occurred via apostolic succession.55  
But what if indefectibility is challenged from within a church that assumes 
indefectibility? Would that not imply that, although the church had potentially erred in assuming 
indefectibility, it was in spite of itself still capable of reform from within? In other words, is fall 
too severe a word to use in making this judgment? For Yoder, the implication of the fall, and 
indeed of the very logic of indefectibility, means that the church cannot truly hear that challenge. 
Thus, while the radical reformers challenged the Catholic Church’s claim to indefectibility, the 
Catholic Church would consistently refuse to hear it. For this reason Yoder argues that “the 
criterion of unfaithfulness is not the doctrinal or moral standard which other churches uphold, 
but rather this congregation’s failure or refusal to receive fraternal admonition and council from 
sister churches.”56  
Appealing again to the “ecclesial Anabaptists,” Yoder argues that they were not 
inherently schismatic or seeking to erect a new church edifice, but were simply concerned with 
taking “their own time seriously as one more kairos of choice between fall and renewal.”57 The 
restitutionist perspective on history is shown here to make reform or renewal truly possible 
because what is being renewed is not only the particular content of the church’s witness, but also 
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the form of the church’s witness, her “social shape.”58 The only way that a faithful form of the 
church could presumably have been embodied in light of the persecution faced by the 
Anabaptists, says Yoder, was through a new beginning apart.  
This might seem schismatic on the part of the radicals. According to Yoder, however, 
quite the opposite is the case. The schism did not occur when the radicals decided to worship 
apart from the Catholic and Magisterial churches. Rather, the schism occurred when 
conversation and debate amidst diversity was no longer possible because the radicals were 
“driven into isolation.”59 Here it is important to highlight a key feature of Yoder’s understanding 
of the church’s task in the world. For Yoder, the church’s task is principally that of mission; of 
being sent into the world with the gospel. Since the church’s task is an outward focused mission 
and not an inward focused “provincialism,” pluralistic accounts of Christ’s meaning should be 
expected; and so disagreement should be expected. The normative state of the church, then, is a 
state of a plurality of perspectives and practices that seek to nonetheless demonstrate the one 
affirmation that “Jesus is Lord.” 
The fall of the church, as a consequence, occurs when that plurality is effaced and 
subsumed into one human language which determines the meaning of Jesus is Lord as the 
affirmation of one tradition alone as legitimate or authoritative. A church that performs this 
effacement has ceased to be church inasmuch as it no longer witnesses to the Gospel as a 
message of Jesus’ Lordship “for the nations,” and instead becomes a witness to a particular 
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people’s efforts at establishing and securing its own identity boundaries under the banner of 
Christ.60 For Yoder, the fall of the church really does happen at this point.  
In the fall, the church becomes so degenerate in her social form as to make Christian 
faithfulness unattainable apart from discontinuity with that form. This is where Yoder draws in 
the much stronger term “apostasy” to describe the fall. Since the church really is located in the 
contingency of history, and so must always face the decision of embracing God’s reign in Christ 
or rejecting it, the church can at any given time really choose paths that are completely opposed 
to the nature of her calling.61 “Although the biblical worldview,” notes Yoder, “sees history as 
meaningful movement, at every point there are two possible ways to move, and at every point 
some people make the wrong decision.”62 This is not to say that apostasy is total; “Faithfulness 
must also be possible.”63 Apostasy, however, is equally possible and possible to such an extent 
that wide ranging critiques of history must be performed in order to discern the root cause of 
unfaithfulness in the task of reform. 
Restitutionist hermeneutics, in this second movement, is at base then simply an 
affirmation that the church really can be unfaithful to her calling; that she can cease to 
authentically be the church, and to a degree of such magnitude that at a given time in history a 
radical separation from the old form of the church must be performed and a radical renewal to 
correct an unfaithful set of decisions made in the past would need to be embraced. In order to 
“renew,” however, there has to be a foundation to rebuild on; there has to be, in other words, an 
objective norm in history that determines why renewal is necessary and how it might be pursued 
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in any given time. This is what the first movement in the restitutionist thought pattern 
establishes. 
Since the incarnation, as definitive testimony to the reign of God, represents the church’s 
true and faithful constant -- its baseline or “objective” criterion -- for Yoder, one must always 
bring that criterion to bear upon the form of the church in a given time in order to judge whether 
or not there is conformity between the two. When in a given context proper conformity to the 
objective form is absent, then churches must become discontinuous with that particular form of 
the (false) church. Those that must be rejected by the restitutionists, according to Yoder, are thus 
not the Catholics or the Protestants as such, but rather particular Protestants and particular 
Catholics who refuse, through various means, to check their own expression of the Gospel with 
the objective form of Christ and scripture. Said differently, it is not fifteen hundred years of 
history that needs to be rejected, but particular and perhaps persistent failures within those fifteen 
hundred years that must be rejected. Indefectibility is problematic, for Yoder, because it claims 
to have assumed the Lordship of Christ revealed in the New Testament into the church. The 
“historical objectivity and distance” of the claims of Christ become subjectively possessed and 
the promise becomes a possession.64 
How might this understanding of fallenness be understood in relation to Soulen and 
Novak’s accounts of supersessionism? At this point it is helpful to be reminded again that in the 
context of the essay being treated here, Yoder treats restitutionist perspective in relation to 
Christian history and not, as in Soulen’s case, Israel’s history as construed by Christian theology. 
Nonetheless, as we will see below, the restitutionist hermeneutic is, for Yoder, just as much a 
hermeneutic for evaluating the history attested to throughout the scriptures as it is a hermeneutic 
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for evaluating history outside of the scriptures. For this reason Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic 
can be evaluated on the basis of Soulen’s (and Novak’s) account of supersessionsm all the same.  
In treating the fall as an operative dynamic in Christian history, Yoder clearly intends to 
avoid making the church’s sin or the fall the dominant theme of Christian history. He claims, 
rather, that obedience is possible. On first impression then, he seems to avoid one dimension to 
what Soulen finds problematic in the standard canonical narrative, namely, the hermeneutic that 
makes the story of the Hebrew Scriptures fundamentally about “the catastrophe of sin and whose 
goal is therefore deliverance from the negative conditions of existence.”65 That being said, 
Yoder’s concern in treating the restitutionist perspective to begin with is, in a sense, to show that 
the church has tended to make too little of its capacity for apostasy. For this reason, Yoder goes 
on to make statements that, on Soulen’s account, might be judged as supersessionist in character. 
For example, with reference to the church that is “defined by succession,” Yoder notes that 
“[t]here can be no cure in continuity” with that church.66 Here the fall really can appear in history 
as a catastrophe, and not only in a singular event in an epic past, but in an ever recurring form.  
In this way, interestingly, rather than repeating a strict punitive or economic 
supersessionism whereby a disobedient Israel is replaced by a new, obedient church, Yoder in 
effect makes supersessionism an ever present dialectic throughout all of history. There is 
faithfulness and there is apostasy, and this is how it always is. There will always be the faithful 
who must, in certain circumstances, supersede the unfaithful. However, Yoder does not simply 
stop at the dialectic. The fall is not just a testament to the tragic in human history; it is also the 
context of the call to faithfulness of which the incarnation attests. Thus, for Yoder, while history 
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testifies to the dialectic of faithfulness and apostasy, to divine election and divine rejection, one 
can really make an effort to be on the right side of this dialectic. How? Through obedience to the 
norm of the church which is the reign of God in Christ. What does obedience to Christ look like, 
for Yoder? Put simply, it is living as Christ lived. But how did Christ live?  
Yoder’s answer is famously provided in his Politics of Jesus but he provides this answer 
throughout his writings. In another key essay already quoted above, Yoder identifies the life of 
Christ as an act of self-emptying (kenosis).67 For Yoder, this self-emptying has particular content 
in Jesus’ history in terms of Jesus’ refusal to control history, even in the face of death on a cross. 
This self-emptying, for Yoder, continues to have particular content in the lives of those who live 
out a similarly self-emptying style of politics. Yoder’s favorite examples in “Anabaptism and 
History” are the Anabaptists who were ‘forced’ to break with the mainstream churches because 
they mixed church and state together and so, by Yoder’s estimation, failed to live kenotically.  
 Here, in his account of the fall of the church, Yoder seems to move into the territory of a 
variety of hard (economic) supersessionism. I say “variety” of hard supersessionism because 
clearly Yoder’s concern is not, strictly speaking, the replacement of Israel per se. Rather, for 
Yoder, the people that are replaced are the people of God in any age who become apostate by 
taking their survival into their own hands. These people are not identified and then superseded on 
the basis of their corporate identity, be it national, ethnic, or otherwise, but by the degree to 
which they are disobedient to the call of God.  
This second movement of the restitutionist perspective thus seems to represent a critical 
adjustment in the restitutionist hermeneutic. Where before Yoder appealed to the incarnation as 
that act of God’s reign that definitively relativizes all attempts to establish the reign of God 
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through a particular tradition or people, Yoder turns in his account of the fall against his own 
insight, suggesting that the dialectic of faithfulness and apostasy can be overcome, if not in 
reality then at least in principle, in the community of people that reject church-state linkages, 
refusing to take survival into their own hands.68 This people, says Yoder, represent the radical 
renewal that God brings in history. In order to adequately judge whether or not this is a fair 
judgment of Yoder’s restitutionist perspective, the third and final movement he describes must 
now be treated. 
 
The Third Movement: Radical Renewal 
For Yoder, just as the church’s normativity hinges on the particularity of Jesus’ claim to 
Lordship, and just as the fall hinges on a particular form of rejection of that Lordship with 
detrimental effects on the social shape of the church in history, so too will it be the case that “a 
particular restitution” of the church will be needed in history.69 Radical renewal occurs, for 
Yoder, quite simply through events in time when Jesus and the New Testament, as the norm of 
the church, are taken with full seriousness by the community gathered in the Spirit. But since, in 
the contingency of history, this “taking Jesus seriously” will almost certainly happen in the face 
of previous decisions to not take Jesus seriously, radical renewal will also require a judgment on 
the preceding history; an evaluation of how and why things went wrong. How did this look for 
the Anabaptists? Did their judgment on previous history, including specific judgments related to 
the ascendency of Emperor Constantine, amount to a rejection of the thirteen or so hundred years 
of history in which God was presumably at work? Yoder would have his readers say no.  
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For Yoder, the Anabaptists did not reject history but took it with such seriousness that 
they had to reject specific decisions made in the past which led to the church’s radical 
unfaithfulness. Since, for Yoder, tradition or continuity in history is not what defines the church 
but rather mission under “the continuing Sovereignty of the Word Incarnate,” there is a sense in 
which history need not be rejected at all but rather accepted for what it is, the place where the 
God of Jesus Christ has staked his claim and where he will continue to stake his claim, in spite of 
opposition from the church or the world.70   
In the movement of radical renewal, the fallen church is thus not so much replaced by a 
true church as, in a sense it was never “established” at all. The church was never established, for 
Yoder, in the sense of made continuous in a particular organizational structure that persists over 
time. Rather, it was only ever present through the Spirit’s making it so in the lives of particular 
people in particular times and places. For Yoder, then, the restitution of the church is quite 
literally nothing less than the “event” of faithfulness which is, finally, a “continuing series of 
new beginnings, similar in shape and spirit, as the objective historicity of Jesus and the apostles, 
mediated through the objectivity of Scripture.”71 
How might this understanding of radical renewal be understood in relation to Soulen’s 
account of supersessionism? Clearly Yoder avoids a strict logic of economic supersessionism by 
virtue of the fact that he does not wish to advocate a definitive replacement of one church form 
with another that will endure as the one “true” church. Since radical renewal is a perpetually 
necessary operation within history as a sphere in which “falls” continue to occur, there can be no 
single definitive replacement of an “Israel” by the “Church” or of Catholics by the Protestants or 
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the Protestants by the Anabaptists. Furthermore, since the church’s identity is not sustained 
through any singular tradition-form, defined by the continuity of flesh, blood, and institutions 
over time, there is no one church or people to replace. But does this really resolve the 
problematics that are central to economic and punitive supersessionism as identified by Soulen 
or does it simply replay them in a different key? It would appear to do the latter.  
Through appeal to the second and third movements of his restitutionist hermeneutic, 
Yoder finally replays a form of economic supersessionism by requiring, on the basis of the norm 
of the church, that the church (or the people of God) not be defined in any way by continuity of 
flesh, blood, or institution over time. To put it in Soulen’s terms, evading continuity in these 
forms effectively promotes the obsolescence of specific traditions of the church or periods of 
church history as an essential feature of God’s one overarching economy of renewal for his 
people. Perhaps strikingly, one could say then that, for Yoder, what finally made particular Jews 
the people of God was not their chosenness as Jews but their obedience as particular Jews. 
Abraham and Sarah, Moses and Miriam, and Jeremiah were not people of God because they 
belonged to a chosen people but because they acted as chosen people. Similarly, Catholics, 
Protestants, and Anabaptists are not the people of God because they are constituted by God’s 
irrevocable decision to inaugurate the Church in Christ, but because they act like Christ.  
Yoder’s exposition of the three movements of the restitutionist thought pattern has now 
been critically engaged. Further, each movement has been examined in light of Soulen’s account 
of supersessionism so as to make the argument stated at the outset of this thesis, namely, that 
Yoder’s restitutionst hermeneutics results in his supersessionist tendencies. Yoder’s 
supersessionist tendencies, it was claimed, come to the fore in his treatment of the “fall” and the 
“radical renewal” of the church. To fill out the above claim, I now turn to treat Yoder’s argument 
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in JCSR that the restitutionist hermeneutic is a Jewish way of viewing history. 
 
‘The Jewish Jesus and Radical Protestantism:’  
Restitutionist Hermeneutics as a Jewish View of History? 
 
Yoder’s essay “The Restitution of the Church,” was initially presented as a lecture in 
1976 at the Ecumenical Institute for Advanced Theological Studies (Tantur) in Jerusalem where, 
Yoder notes, he delivered “three presentations on ‘The Jewish Jesus and Radical 
Protestantism.’”72 Yoder begins by providing what he calls a “sketchy historical account” of the 
radical reformers, the “other stream of reformations” that are less well known by the mainstream 
traditions.73 He lists four “common features” among these radicals, namely congregationalism, 
voluntary membership, religious liberty, and non-violence.74 Each of these features, argues 
Yoder, set these reformers apart from the official Protestant Reformation.  
Thus the first part of the essay is essentially a summary of the key themes of 
“Anabaptism and History,” with some modifications and additions to meet the needs of the 
particular setting of the presentation. Yoder begins by setting up the predictable antinomies. 
Where the official reformers were concerned about conformity to right doctrine and 
organizational hierarchy, the radicals held diverse and at times conflicting doctrinal positions but 
were unified congregationally in spite of diversity and were “opposed to hierarchy as a definition 
of the unity of the Church.”75 Where the official reformers still practiced involuntary 
membership through infant baptism, the radicals practiced voluntary membership by adult 
baptism. Where the official reformers made “religion and politics...inseparable,” the radicals 
                                                          
72
 Yoder, JCSR, 142. 
73
 Yoder, JCSR, 131. 
74
 Yoder, JCSR, 136-137. 
75
 Yoder, JCSR, 136. 
47 
 
gave up “control over its members.”76 And finally, where the official reformers still wielded the 
sword, the radicals generally (but not always) practiced non-violence or non-resistance.77  
Having established these features, Yoder goes on to ask “[i]n what sense can it be said 
that these movements represent ‘an alternative perspective’ on Christian history?”78 Yoder lists 
three ways in which this can be said. First, Yoder notes that the radicals had a unique view on 
what makes renewal and reformation truly possible within the church. The restitutionist, 
according to Yoder, sees the present state of the church as not containing the resources necessary 
to renew the church. Echoing his convictions expressed in “Anabaptism and History,” Yoder 
appeals to the language of “organism” to describe the church as fallen. Perhaps intensifying his 
comments regarding the fall in “Anabaptism and History,” Yoder notes that “Christendom does 
not merely need improvement around the edges; it has become disobedient at the heart.”79  
The radical restitutionists, according to Yoder, could not accept that reformation could 
truly occur in continuity with the “organism” that claimed to be the body of Christ at that time 
because that organism, that body, was sick at its core, to such an extreme so as to be beyond 
repair or renewal.80 What was the nature of the sickness? For Yoder, the organism that was “the 
church” at that time was, as it were, incurvatus in se. As we saw already in the previous essay, 
for Yoder a church that is “turned inward on itself” cannot be truly critical of its own path in 
history and neither can it take criticism from any authority external from itself. It cannot, in other 
words, truly and authentically declare that Jesus is Lord. 
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Here Yoder draws in the terms “defectibility” and “apostasy” again to argue that just 
because a particular people claims to be the church or the faithful people of God, does not mean, 
in fact, that it is. For him, to be faithful means to act like the Christ and if that action is absent, it 
can be reasonably assumed that so too is the God of Jesus Christ absent in that people. “God,” 
says Yoder, “might have been abandoned by the people claiming to act in his name.”81 
According to Yoder, because of their own commitment really to act in God’s name, the radicals 
recognized the need for “a new beginning, to correct for a fundamental wrong turn in the past.”82 
But what resources do these radicals draw upon in pursuing this “new” beginning if not 
resources already within the organism that is the ‘fallen’ church? 
This question is answered by Yoder when he notes a second way that the radicals offer an 
alternative perspective on history. The radicals had a different understanding of the way in which 
scripture is authoritative for the community. According to Yoder, the reformers assumed a 
hermeneutical framework that was defined in advance by “the existing structures” of the church. 
The structures of the church, then, were the basis upon which to understand the apostolic task of 
the church as described in scripture.83 Yoder notes that the radicals were biblicist, however, and 
that this meant that no pre-existing structure, other than the “objectivity of Scripture” could limit 
their interpretation. There is no need to consult a hierarchy to understand the pertinence of the 
texts. Scripture alone is thus the fundamental resource of the church as it pursues renewal. This 
being the case, rather than scripture having to resource the church within already pre-established 
apostolic offices, “new” forms of “apostolicity” will arise out of scripture itself.84 The church 
will, in essence, be made in the moment of the Spirit’s action, mediated through scripture. The 
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resources for the restitution of the church are therefore external from the church as it is in that 
moment. 
Third and briefly, Yoder notes that the radicals offer an alternative perspective on 
Christian history because their views demonstrate “the seriousness of history.”85 Here again 
Yoder intimates the necessity of historiography for theology, stating that “[o]nly if specific 
judgements on particular histories and specific infidelities are confronted by new beginnings 
does the historical crunch take on the kind of earnestness it has within the Bible itself.”86 While 
this statement is somewhat cryptic, it is reasonable to assume that what Yoder is referring to is 
the task of the prophets in Israel who would call Israel back to a fundamental faithfulness to 
YHWH.87 Indeed, elsewhere Yoder seems to identify the church as carrying forward specifically 
“the prophets’ line” of Israel’s history.88 
As one can see, all of what has just been summarized above is in many ways a parallel 
account of the movements that Yoder described in “Anabaptism and History” with some slightly 
different emphases. Where this essay becomes particularly unique is where Yoder takes his own 
advice from his earlier essay, and applies the restitutionist perspective to “the reading of other 
crises.”89 This is where Yoder begins to address how the “shift in church/world relations” which 
the restitutionist perspective on history has the capacity to discern due to its critical view of 
history, had specific implications for the church’s relationship to Judaism.90 
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Essentially, the implication that Yoder draws in the following section is that the shift in 
church/world relations symbolized by Constantine resulted in the loss of the Jewish and 
“Hebraic” view of history itself which, for Yoder, is a view of history similar to the restitutionist 
radicals that he had previously been describing.91 Where Yoder has been treating the antinomies 
between reformers and restitutionists, he now treats what he sees to be the accord between the 
radicals and the Jewishness of Jesus. Jesus, as a Jew, is part of the fabric of the particular history 
in which the God of Israel calls his people to faithfulness. Jesus does not reject Israel’s scriptures 
but “confirms” them; he doesn’t usher in a totally new ethic but, in recognition of the imminence 
of the Kingdom of God, takes up the ethic of Jeremiah who, in exile, sought the peace of the city 
where God has sent him.92 This human and Jewish Jesus is, for Christians, “the norm” and so 
Jesus’ own particularity as part of the history of the Jews becomes the criteria upon which to 
judge faithfulness to the God of Israel in either the first or the twentieth century. As norm, Jesus 
can never be a universal principle, a doctrine, or a justification used to prop up human authority 
structures because the God of Israel does not save through principles, doctrines, or human 
authority but rather events of salvation.93 Restitutionist readings of history are “Hebraic,” says 
Yoder, in that they critique events in history, such as moments of apostasy, “on the grounds of 
criteria [other events] drawn from the same story” and not from principles abstracted from the 
story.94  
The restitutionist view is also Jewish, notes Yoder, because it is concerned with the 
“unity of halakah and aggadah,” or as Yoder put it earlier, the “consonance of method and 
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message.”95 Ethics and dogma (or teachings) are of a piece. Furthermore, this unity is, for 
Christians, understood principally through Jesus, and so through one who was an “interpreter of 
Torah,” offering “ethical guidance” for his disciples.96 Finally, Yoder notes that the restitutionist 
perspective is Jewish in its affirmation of apostasy and defectibility. Here Yoder wonders a bit, 
suggesting “only as an hypothesis,” that Hebrew understandings of “the refractoriness of history” 
would suggest that the Hebrew people would have understood indefectibility as belonging only 
to the promise of God, “never becoming negotiable as our appropriation of it.”97  
In relation to this latter claim of Yoder’s regarding indefectibility, an anecdote from the 
life of one of Yoder’s teachers, Karl Barth, will be instructive for further testing Yoder’s specific 
“hypothesis” and measuring it against charges of supersessionism. Michael Wyschogrod, the 
Jewish theologian, recounts a particularly vivid encounter that he had with Barth on a “sunny 
morning in August 1966.”98 In the course of their encounter, Barth had made the somewhat 
typical Christian quip at Wyschogrod that “You Jews have the promise but not the fulfillment; 
we Christians have both promise and fulfillment.”99 Responding to Barth, Wyschogrod said 
“With human promises, one can have the promise but not the fulfillment. But a promise of God 
is like money in the bank. If we have his promise, we have its fulfillment and if we do not have 
the fulfillment, we do not have the promise.”100 Evidently Barth, the preeminent theologian, had 
“never thought of it that way.”101 
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While certain resonances exist between Yoder and Barth’s views on a number of topics, 
in many ways Yoder’s account of defectibility, grounded as it is in his account of “the fall,” is at 
odds with both Barth and Wyschogrod’s accounts as provided here. For Yoder, it is not quite 
right to say, with Barth, that “we [Christians] have both promise and fulfillment.” For Yoder, 
neither the promise nor the fulfillment is ours to “have.”102 “The church’s mission is not to share 
what she has,” says Yoder, “but to proclaim a promise.”103 In this respect too, then, Yoder differs 
from Wyschogrod in that, to say that “a promise of God is like money in the bank” is too close to 
saying that God funds or credits his elect people’s existence regardless of whether or not they are 
faithful.  
While no doubt Wyschogrod would want to affirm the seriousness of Israel’s sin, that sin 
never would be understood, for Wyschogrod, as the site of a total separation between Israel and 
God.104 How could it be, as Israel, even unfaithful Israel, only exists because of God in the first 
place?105 Apostasy or defectibility, in other words, never results in a real and total loss of the 
promise for Israel. While Yoder no doubt affirms God’s relentless pursuit of the apostate, he 
would not want to say that the apostate “has” God’s promise (and so God’s fulfillment) in spite 
of their apostasy. How could the apostate have it since, strictly speaking, neither do the faithful? 
Wyschogrod’s assertion of the fulfillment of the promise being “in the bank” sounds too much 
like exactly the kind of possession and guarantee that Yoder’s restitutionist theology seeks to 
unmask by pointing out how history and reality are far too refractory and contingent for such 
guarantees. 
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Thus it might be, on account of a comparison with one modern Jew, that Yoder’s 
hypothesis regarding a Jewish understanding of the refractoriness of history (which is supposed 
as also a Free Church vision), does not accord, at least not neatly, with a Jewish vision expressed 
by a contemporary Jew who is nonetheless as concerned as Yoder is about the sin of the people 
of God. Here it is helpful to ask whether or not Yoder’s account of the restitutionist vision finally 
reduces the promise of God to a completely transcendental ideal that can never, strictly speaking, 
be spoken of as carried or possessed in any people in the world. Since, for Yoder, restitution has 
to it the supreme character of an event whose continuity in recurrence can only be experienced in 
events of newness and not captured or had in a particular tradition, the promise of God really 
does remain only a promise transcendent of a fleshly people.  
This latter point has been made more explicit in a recent work by Tommy Givens when 
he notes that because “Yoder’s theological historiography of the people Israel is typological...the 
identity of the people [Israel] inheres in the particular political type” and not in the people 
“constituted by God’s faithfully holding Israelite faithfulness and unfaithfulness together with 
remembrance and forgiveness.”106 The “theological historiography” that Givens references here 
is Yoder’s restitutionist perspective. The “political type” that Givens refers to is essentially the 
kenotic politics of Jesus which, as we saw above, was Yoder’s answer to the problem of the fall; 
the radical renewal that could overcome, but only for a time, the dialectic of apostasy and 
faithfulness in history.  
For Yoder, says Givens, the logical result of this historiography is that there is finally “no 
authentic people, no real promise.”107 It is difficult to imagine a “harder” form of (economic) 
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supersessionism than this. Furthermore, this is extremely ironic as, for Yoder, the church is 
always and everywhere to be a visible people. Yet if Givens is right then the church Yoder 
describes really is, finally, invisible. Yoder himself seems to (unknowingly?) concede this point 
when he states that “[t]he future of the Church is sure in the sense that God is a God who gives 
life to the dead. Yet the future of our church, that of any given community, enjoys no 
security.”108 But if the church is only the visible church, then what church can there be but “our” 
church, stains and all? Put differently, if Israel is to be a people of the flesh, then what Israel can 
there be but the entirety of Israel as she has existed diversely throughout history? 
 
Conclusion 
Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic has now been critically engaged through two primary 
texts and evaluated in light of Soulen’s account of supersessionism. His theology was shown to 
replay certain forms of economic supersessionism, not only in relation to the people Israel but 
also in relation to the church; to the people of God, that is, generally. Yoder’s account of the first 
movement of the restitutionist vision, the norm of the incarnation, resists any strict 
supersessionism. However, when Yoder turns to address the “fall” and the “radical renewal” of 
the church, he begins to advocate the supersession of an apostate Israel/church with an ideal 
Israel/church. An imagined Jewish response by Wyschogrod has also been offered. This inquiry 
now turns to address the key question that will occupy the final two chapters: how can Yoder’s 
restitutionist hermeneutic be reformed so as to avoid his supersessionism? The next chapter lays 
the groundwork of an answer through an engagement with the Jewish philosopher Peter Ochs.  
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Chapter 3 
Peter Ochs: Philosophy, Scripture, and Jewish Identity After Modernity  
 
Introduction 
Above, the claim was made that Yoder’s supersessionism arises in significant measure 
out of his particular use of a restitutionist hermeneutic for evaluating history. While this was a 
necessary first step, on its own it is not enough to chart a path forward for reforming those 
elements of Yoder’s theology in order to avoid economic (hard) forms of supersessionism that 
result particularly from his visions of the fall of the church and the church’s radical renewal. In 
this chapter, I lay the foundations for reforming Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic through a 
further treatment of Ochs’ critique of Yoder.  
In order to adequately hear that critique, however, it is my conviction that Ochs’ own 
hermeneutical convictions as a pragmatic philosopher must be adequately understood. In order to 
make Ochs’ hermeneutical convictions heard I perform a broad reading of his scholarly corpus, 
including significant developments in his philosophical convictions. Ochs often highlights the 
particular development of his thought with explicit reference to the concrete contexts in which he 
wrote and developed as a thinker in almost every one of his publications. As will be shown 
below, this aspect to Ochs’ writing is not an exercise in narcissism but is actually a key 
methodological requirement of Ochs’ particular convictions as a “pragmatic” philosopher.1  
While in the following treatment of Ochs I have done my best to integrate details of 
Ochs’ biography in such a way as to avoid unnecessary details, the reader will nonetheless notice 
the biographical flavor with which Ochs will be treated. Again though, it should be stressed that 
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Ochs’ biography is not adiaphora in the context of this inquiry but integral for showing how his 
own way of reasoning has been profoundly shaped by the various individuals and communities 
that Ochs has engaged over the years. Throughout, I draw Ochs’ critiques of Yoder in JCSR back 
into focus in order to show the foundation of Ochs’ criticisms. I end by arguing that Ochs’ 
criticisms of Yoder, founded as they are on his hermeneutical convictions as a pragmatic 
philosopher, also suggest specific paths for repairing (Ochs’ term) or reforming Yoder’s 
theology in such a way as to make Yoderian theology without supersessionism possible. 
  
Peter Ochs and Reparative Hermeneutics 
If in the analysis above, Yoder could be identified as a “restitutionist” who was 
concerned to assist the whole church in providing a witness to Christ’s Lordship in the world, 
how might Ochs be identified? Ochs and Yoder’s works have distinct parallels in that they both 
are concerned with the reformation of their respective communities. Yoder was concerned with 
reforming, or better, restoring an original vision of Jesus to the church that, surprisingly, centered 
on Jesus’ Jewish identity. As was shown above, an important part of restoring this vision, for 
Yoder, involved employing a restitutionist hermeneutic. As a Jew, however, Ochs has pursued 
his concern for the reformation of his Jewish community through his own distinct hermeneutic 
which is quite different from Yoder’s. Examining Ochs’ hermeneutic is thus necessary in order 
to adequately hear his concerns with Yoder’s own alternative vision of the Jewish-Christian 
Schism. 
From a broad reading of his work, it becomes clear that Ochs seeks to employ what might 
be called a “hermeneutics of repair,” or “reparative hermeneutics.” Elsewhere, Ochs has 
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described his hermeneutics as a kind of “reparative reasoning.”2 What such a hermeneutics 
encompasses will now be explored below with reference to what I see as three significant stages 
in Ochs’ scholarly career. The first stage briefly signals Ochs’ initial excitement with several 
enlightenment philosophers and their use of reason as a powerful tool for addressing the wounds 
of the world. The second stage details his subsequent move to return to traditional Jewish sources 
of wisdom for articulating an alternative form of reason after being disappointed with the project 
of enlightenment. The third stage signals, as it were, Ochs’ attempt to reconcile reason and 
revelation, not through a simplistic synthesis, but through a complex understanding of the 
relational dynamic joining the two together. Throughout each of these stages, I draw in Ochs’ 
criticisms of Yoder in JCSR in order to make better sense of them. 
 
Aftermodern and Post-Critical Inquiry: In Search of Reparative Reason and Logic 
 
Ochs notes that early in his scholarly career while he was studying anthropology and 
philosophy at Yale, he took “to embark upon the rationalist program of the Enlightenment: to 
become familiar with Descartes, Hegel and, above all, Kant, as if they were long-awaited 
prophets.”3 What Ochs hoped would be found in Kant was “rational clarity and coherence, and 
hope that all the world could be conceived and lived as a universal symphony and, at least on 
some level, in potential agreement.”4 Ochs has thus described his own scholarly passions in the 
past and, it should be noted, up to the present, as geared towards a desire for a way of “reasoning 
that would be a light of truth and a salve to all of humanity’s wounds.”5  
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At the heart of much of Ochs’ scholarly corpus is the question of which practices of 
reasoning can adequately address human woundedness in its many manifestations. Put a little 
differently in terms that will later be shown to be crucial for Ochs, what practices of reasoning 
can repair the wounds of the world and what will these practices look like in the communities 
they are located? These questions, as will become clear below, have led Ochs into a rich variety 
of disciplinary investigations, spanning ethnographic, rabbinic, and philosophical studies.  
Early engagement with the modern rationalist program epitomized in Descartes and Kant 
would do more, however, to make Ochs question the prophetic value of the aforementioned 
philosophers than it would to fulfill his youthful hopes in their potential. Rather than finding 
rational or logical resources for conducting humanity’s universal symphony, Ochs notes that 
instead he found in Kant “the circularity of ego-centered self-reference.”6 What was missing in 
Kantian philosophy, for Ochs, was the recognition that Kant’s own style of critical reasoning was 
indebted to particular developments within pre-existing traditions that made such critical 
reasoning possible.7 By not admitting the traditioned quality of its own reasoned discourse, 
however, the ratio of Kantian philosophy tended to perpetuate a false sense of universal 
objectivity on the part of the reasoner.  
This false sense of objectivity also carried with it, as a consequence, a colonial style of 
reasoning, inasmuch as rival forms of ratio that did not fit the modern paradigm would be 
deemed “subjective” and thus overtaken by “objectivist” forms of inquiry.8 Ironically, then, the 
modern rationality that Ochs hoped would repair human woundedness only created a new site of 
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woundedness, only this time at the fundamental level of thought itself. If modern reason held the 
potential to address the wounds of humanity, but the shape of that reason itself was wounded or 
wounding, then the task of repairing the world only became that much more complicated. 
Diagnosis would now be needed, not only of the wounds created by overt acts of violence among 
particular communities, but also of the wounds created by logical and reason-based systems of 
thought that aimed, at least in theory, to seek a method for repairing the world through 
conceiving of it through a universal frame of reason.  
Ochs’ formative education in anthropology, in which he did ethnographic research in 
Micronesia, began to prepare him to diagnose the extent and seriousness of this deeply 
embedded wound within a variety of disciplinary contexts.9 Ochs notes that in his work in 
Micronesia, he began to see that the assumptions of “modern western inquiry,” which were the 
basis for certain forms of “ethnoscience” operative at the time, could not make sense of the 
“powerful forms of rationality” that were indigenous to the people of the Micronesian Islands.10 
The wound of modernity, for Ochs, presented itself most explicitly in its exclusionary tactics, 
prohibiting a priori forms of rationality unique to different cultures and peoples. 
In an essay titled “The Liberal Arts Disease and Its Neo-Scholastic Cure,” written years 
later, Ochs argued that the wound of modern reason had become inimically embedded in the 
modern phenomenon of liberal arts institutions to such an extent as to label it, in continuity with 
the other medical terminology he employs, a “disease.” 11 Ochs claimed that the liberal arts 
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disease was observable in the systemic willingness of liberal arts institutions to “join Kant 
in…compensat[ing] for excessive despair about the insufficiencies of traditional wisdom with 
excessive optimism about the potential of reason to repair those insufficiencies.”12  
According to Ochs, however, the potential of reason, while real, was in a Kantian 
framework, limited to its power to critique tradition, not to found its own tradition of repair or 
address particular wounds within previous traditions. Ochs came to believe that the critical 
reasoning typical of modernity should thus never be its own source of wisdom, but rather a tool 
employed within particular traditions of wisdom that seek to address particular wounds. What 
disillusioned Ochs about Kant was the way in which his Critique of Pure Reason had tended to 
mistake the critical reason that is necessary to keep “excessive traditionalism” in check, with the 
wisdom that is necessary to avoid the despair that comes from “excessive skepticism.”13  
With the above narrative account in mind, it is instructive to draw in one of the “burdens” 
Ochs discerns in Yoder’s arguments in JCSR. In the introduction I summarized four forms of 
supersessionism that Ochs saw operative in Yoder’s work on the Jewish Jesus. What is clear 
from reading Ochs’ commentaries, however, is that these forms of supersessionism are only 
possible on the basis of a peculiar logic that animates them. This “logic” of supersessionism is 
what will, throughout this chapter, become increasingly evident.  
Yoder, argues Ochs, demonstrates modern tendencies to “mistrust all inherited traditions” 
and as a corollary “to place excessive trust in immediate or direct disclosures of knowledge.”14 
With reference to the above analysis on Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic, we might say that 
Yoder is most ‘Kantian’ when he uses restitutionism as a kind of critical reason that could 
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radically critique oppressive forms of tradition.15 Since Yoder was so critical of traditions, the 
knowledge that funded his understanding of radical renewal for the church ended up having to be 
procured directly, without the mediation of a particular people or tradition. Yoder saw it, in a 
sense, in reverse. The churches of the establishment were the ones that placed too much trust in 
their tradition as a kind of “natural disclosure of knowledge” with no mediation of the Spirit. But 
in a sense Ochs’ question to Yoder is, if there is no trust in your tradition whatsoever, then where 
do you even get a notion to make the critique you are making? Yoder might answer that he gets 
it from scripture and the objective history of Christ, but Ochs would only reply that these are 
realities that are always encountered through tradition, and never directly.  
Ochs’ dissatisfaction with Kant’s tradition-critical approach led him to a point of 
realization that if a salve to all of humanity’s wounds was really to be found, it would be found 
through a recovery of the reparative resources within diverse forms of traditioned wisdom. Thus, 
while Ochs would agree that, historically, the development of modern rationalism was and 
continues to be important within the world’s wisdom traditions, it nevertheless could not and 
should not be seen as the pinnacle of rational development, especially for those concerned with 
the task of repairing human woundedness or suffering. Ochs’ suspicion that the modern, 
rationalist program failed at times to offer a sufficient account of its own contextual form of 
rationality, and the adequate means of repairing or mending wounded humanity, led him to 
consider more intentionally how other forms of rationality could offer “guidance and healing” to 
communities in a broken world.16  Ochs describes how this realization brought him to The 
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Jewish Theological Seminary of America, where he “submitted the ego cogito to retraditioning” 
through study under the rabbinic scholar Max Kadushin.17 
 
The Reason of the Rabbis: In Defense of ‘Indigenous Rules for Repair/Reform’ 
Kadushin was a formative teacher for Ochs as it was under him that Ochs saw a way of 
reasoning in engagement with traditional rabbinic texts that, while indebted to the critical 
intelligence of modern rationalism typical of Kant, was unapologetically concerned with learning 
primarily from the wisdom and reason “indigenous” to the traditional sources of Rabbinic 
Judaism.18 Ochs notes that Kadushin’s work centered on addressing a key problem in modern 
interpretations of the ‘mind’ of the rabbis. The problem in those interpretations was that they 
required the reasoning of the rabbis to conform to a system or style of reasoning that was not 
itself indigenous to rabbinic thought.19 In light of this, Kadushin was concerned to show how 
rabbinic theology did not set out to communicate its values through logical statements or 
propositions that could be systematically defended vis-a-vis the criteria devised by modern 
rationalism, but rather sought to communicate values through fundamental “value concepts.”20 
Explaining Kadushin’s science of value concepts would require much more time and space than 
is possible or pertinent at this point, but a basic definition, pulled from Ochs’ engagement with 
him in his essay “Max Kadushin as Rabbinic Pragmatist” will suffice for the present purpose of 
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this chapter.21  
Ochs describes Kadushin’s value concepts as concepts that “represent fundamental or 
irreducible elements in the valuational life of, in his case, the rabbinic community.”22 These 
fundamental or irreducible elements are not exposed on the surface of rabbinic statements but, 
according to Kadushin, lie “behind the statements.”23 While these fundamental elements lay 
behind rabbinic statements, however, they are alluded to by the “rabbinical authorities” by the 
names they give them such as, to cite one example, “middat hadin (“God’s attribute of 
justice”).”24 In this way, according to Ochs, Kadushin attempted to provide a conceptual 
framework from which to identify the fundamental critical norms that give rabbinic Judaism its 
coherence, fundamental unity, and reformational capacity, while leaving open the question as to 
the definition of rabbinic norms as such definitions would be performative and context specific.25 
The problem with modern approaches to interpreting the mind of the rabbis, according to 
Kadushin, was that modern interpreters assumed that the critical norms advocated by the rabbis 
could be statically defined and so conceivable according to propositional systems of logic which 
would allow them to be abstracted from the variety of contexts in which such norms would be 
practiced and tested by rabbinic communities. 
In opposition to this modern hermeneutic, Ochs notes that Kadushin “sought to identify 
rabbinic Judaism’s indigenous rules for reform, which, he argued, constitute Judaism’s “non-
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philosophic” (or non-a-prioristic) rationality.”26 The rationality of a particular collection of 
rabbinic texts, described in this way, is irreducibly particular, containing rules for the repair or 
reform of a particular community facing particular problems. The fact that these rules are 
indigenous to a tradition is significant, as whatever rules for reform are discerned in any given 
context they can never be presumed as universally valid forms of reform to be applied across 
diverse communities in time and space. In this way, these indigenous rules cannot, strictly 
speaking, rely on a universal form of reason akin to Cartesian or Kantian conceptions of reason 
described above. As a consequence, Ochs calls Kadushin an “aftermodern” thinker. For, rather 
than seeking a universal form of reason to address wounded humanity, a reason, that is, that 
required a fundamental suspicion of inherited traditions as with Kant, Kadushin’s concern was to 
“identify, within the practices of classical rabbinic Judaism, behavioral norms pertinent to his 
own community of Jewish practice,”27 and use those norms in order to repair “problems in 
contemporary Jewish practice.”28 
While Ochs notes that he appreciated what he saw as Kadushin’s overall aftermodern 
intentions, however, he is also critical of Kadushin where he feels Kadushin showed himself to 
be an “incomplete aftermodernist.”29  According to Ochs, in spite of his intent to the contrary, 
Kadushin let the social scientific tools that he used to analyze rabbinic Judaism shape the subject 
matter to a degree too reminiscent of modern rationalist approaches.30 In particular, the 
organicist philosophy that Kadushin used for developing his account of value concepts, 
according to Ochs, “retained the reductive sciences’ dichotomies between analysis and analysand 
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and between objective and subjective inquiry…”31 In other words, the incompleteness of 
Kadushin’s aftermodern inquiry was due to a lack of hermeneutical transparency and humility 
typical of modern rationalism, as the rationalist tools of social science that Kadushin used for 
interpreting the rabbinic mind were finally used to mask his own particular subjective 
motivations as an interpreter of rabbinic Judaism in the interest of showing rabbinic Judaism’s 
“coherence” and so legitimating “his judgments.”32 Here the insidious nature of certain uses of 
modern reason or logic is on display, as even when inquirers seek to combat its colonial reach or 
repair the wounds it has created it is still employed as the foundational thought-framework.  
Here again it is instructive to draw in some of the “burdens” that Ochs discerns in Yoder. 
Before getting to more of the specific complaints that Ochs mentions it is helpful to draw some 
parallels between what Yoder sought to do in his writings through his use of the restitutionist 
perspective and what Kadushin sought to do in his science of value concepts. Remember that 
Kadushin’s science of value concepts attempted to provide a conceptual framework from which 
to identify rabbinic Judaism’s norms while leaving open the question as to the definition of those 
norms as such definitions would be performative and context specific. There is a striking parallel 
here with what Yoder sought to do in his own account of the first ‘movement’ of the 
restitutionist thought pattern. For Yoder, the “norm” of the church can be articulated through the 
value concept “Jesus is Lord.” Since Jesus’ Lordship, as a norm, implies a distinction between 
Jesus and the community called ‘church’ in any given age, what Jesus’ Lordship means from age 
to age will always be a context specific question. Here Ochs would see Kadushin and Yoder at 
their aftermodern best. 
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Where Ochs identifies Kadushin’s error, however, is exactly where he identifies Yoder’s 
error. Both start with the right intentions. In the first essay of JCSR, Ochs sees Yoder arguing 
rightly for recognition of the plurality of Jewish-Christian identity in the first century so as to 
problematize and challenge the view of a clean split between an edifice called “Judaism” and 
“Christianity” somewhere in the first few centuries CE.  “There was,” Yoder argues, “no such 
thing as normative Judaism” to break away from.33 Rather, says Yoder, there were many 
competing visions and norms, all vying for recognition. Kadushin offered somewhat of a similar 
challenge to modern interpretations of rabbinic material that sought to conceive of that material 
as a univocal mind. The modern interpretations of the rabbinic mind sought inappropriately to 
capture the diversity and plurality of rabbinic thought into a conceptual edifice derived from a 
tradition and source (modernity) external to the tradition of the Rabbis.  
Then, however, Kadushin and Yoder make an error of judgement. Kadushin goes on to 
recommend his science of value concepts as the right way to understand the rabbinic mind and 
Yoder goes on to recommend a “normative” vision of the Jewish Jesus and Jeremiac Judaism as 
the right vision of Judaism and Christianity.34 Should Yoder be faulted for this? After all, Yoder 
claims that he is not making this claim as if he has total access to the truth. Rather, Yoder notes, 
Christians “confess a truth which has taken possession of us through no merit of our own.”35 And 
yet, while this confession would perhaps not be scandalous if addressed in such a way as to build 
up a particular Christian community, it becomes scandalous when the confession makes a 
possessive claim on behalf of all Christians and Jews. For Yoder, however, the Gospel is 
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precisely the “scandal of particularity.”36 In suggesting that Jesus’ particularity is something that 
can be expressed by a Christian in Jewish terms, however, Yoder seems to go beyond mere 
Christian confession.37 
Ochs thus critiques Yoder, just as he did Kadushin, for not admitting the context specific 
case he himself is making and the reality that if the case were made in another time or place, it 
would have to be open to change in principle. Ochs diagnoses Yoder’s error as demonstrative of 
a modern “tendency to uncompromising judgements, which tendency reinforces and is reinforced 
by a doctrine of fulfilled or messianic time: that in Jesus Christians have the potential to live in 
fulfilled time.”38 In other words, the use of the value concept “Jesus is Lord” in Yoder tends to 
resolve or suspend the hermeneutic task involved in the ongoing work of reformational activity 
within a given community rather than open it up. Yoder, in other words, seems to have too ready 
access to what radical renewal should always look like.  
While it is impossible to engage in any form of reparative or reformative inquiry without 
interpretive tools, the difference between modern and aftermodern inquiry, for Ochs, is the 
degree to which the reasoner involved in the inquiry assumes or ascribes objectivity to the 
inquiry process as a whole or to the individual inquirer apart from her place within a community 
of interpreters. What Ochs calls the “wound of modernity” is not that it reasons towards making 
normative judgments, but precisely that it ascribes objectivity or universality to a particular form 
or procedural use of reasoning toward norms, without admitting the subjective origin or 
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performative context of the form or use of said reason. The corrective and promise of 
aftermodern forms of inquiry is, for Ochs, to be especially aware of the subjective or 
hermeneutical component of all dimensions of inquiry. 
Where Ochs thus faults his teacher Kadushin and where he also faults Yoder is where he 
feels they abandon their own best insights regarding, on the one hand, the indigenous nature of 
the rabbinic value concepts (Kadushin), and on the other hand, what might be called “the 
contingency of the present” under the rule of God (Yoder). They do so by attempting to postulate 
their own social scientific method or restitutionist hermeneutic as providing “universally 
warranted readings” of Judaism rather than one way of performatively engaging Jewish texts 
among others in their own time and place.39 According to Ochs, Kadushin sought to use an 
organicist model in order to avoid reductionistic or dichotomous judgements when interpreting 
rabbinic texts, he ironically re-employed the method of reduction and dichotomy by not 
subjecting his own method and motivations to the same scrutiny of context-specificity that he 
required of the rabbinic texts.40 If Kadushin was right that rabbinic forms of reasoning held the 
potential to repair the wounds of his community, then the methods by which such reasoning 
would provide suggested cures or rules for repair would, according to Ochs, have to be chastened 
by the limits of the critical enterprise typical of modernity. Universally warranted readings of 
rabbinic Judaism, in other words, would have to be avoided as they only replayed modernity’s 
exclusionary tactics by not allowing the texts of the rabbis to continue to speak in new ways and 
in new contexts.  
Appreciative of Kadushin’s method, in that it made great strides towards aftermodern 
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forms of inquiry, but feeling like something more was needed to make his method more 
consistent, Ochs returned to his alma mater and entered into Doctoral studies in Philosophy, a 
decision which his teacher Max Kadushin apparently did not take kindly.41 Ochs notes that he 
found himself compelled, however, to “improve my understanding of the philosophical-
hermeneutical instruments that might serve his [Kadushin’s] theological project” through 
graduate work on the American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce.42 What Ochs hoped Peirce 
would provide him with was “a logic for reading rabbinic texts” that could repair errant 
tendencies in the modern readings that Kadushin at once moved beyond and yet, in his own way, 
recapitulated.43 
 
Philosophy Again: Reading Pragmatically as the Repair of Systems of Repair 
Ochs would go on to write his PhD dissertation on Peirce.44 In his magnum opus, Peirce, 
Pragmatism, and the Logic of Scripture, published eighteen years later, Ochs notes the particular 
interests that he brought with him to his study of Peirce. These interests serve as a helpful 
summary of much of Ochs’ concerns already explored above, as well as the concerns that seem 
to continue to animate Ochs’ scholarly endeavors to this day: 
I brought with me interests I imagine other readers may share: a concern to find 
reasonably precise ways of talking about imprecise things without losing the meaning of 
the imprecision itself; a belief that phenomena of everyday language, including the 
everyday practices of religion, are among those things; a love of critical reasoning but an 
acquired distrust of criticism that has lost sense of having a purpose; disillusionment with 
‘modern’ or Enlightenment attempts to make a metaphysics—and also a religion—out of 
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the rational critique of inherited traditions of knowledge and practice; a conviction that 
post-Enlightenment anti-rationalism—including romanticisms, emotivisms and a variety 
of totalizing ideologies of power, history, experience and so on—may prove, logically, to 
be the other side of the rationalist coin; fascination with the irrevocable contextuality—
temporal, historical, linguistic, social, biological—of rational judgments, but also with 
their persistent ‘rationality’…45 
 
It was through his study of Peirce’s pragmatic method in particular that Ochs found his interests 
directly stimulated and enriched. While even a basic summary of Peirce’s pragmatism is itself 
beyond the scope of this inquiry (Ochs himself refers to Peirce’s work as “labyrinthine”), Ochs’ 
own use of the term will be the primary point of reference for what follows.46 Ochs begins his 
study by defining Peirce’s pragmatism as a “theory about how to correct inadequate--because 
overly precise--definitions of imprecise things.”47 To be sure, such a definition is itself quite 
vague, and appropriately so based on the particular concerns Ochs had. That being said, the 
definition takes on a greater degree of clarity when one keeps in mind Ochs’ concerns about the 
modern rationalist program. Descartes and Kant, and their progeny, were too precise in their 
definitional judgments and as a consequence the systems of thought they developed had become 
the source of deeper wounds within many of the structures of society. Ochs saw Peirce’s 
pragmatism as a helpful method by which to offer corrective or reparative reasonings precisely 
for this type of precision.48  
Peirce’s pragmatic reasoning developed through critical engagement with what Ochs 
calls the “Cartesian-Kantian tradition of epistemology.”49 As already indicated, Ochs himself had 
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already engaged both Descartes and Kant with an expectation of their promise and with a 
subsequent sense of skepticism as to whether or not what their philosophies represented were 
viable methods for repairing wounded humanity.50 According to Ochs, pragmatists see the 
Cartesian-Kantian tradition as representing a failed attempt at “a rationalistic method of problem 
solving.”51 This method failed since, although it wished to address particular problems within a 
tradition of practice, it assumed that it was itself a new tradition with no integral relation to the 
tradition(s) it sought to repair.52 For the pragmatists, however, problems can only be addressed 
by way of inquiry that follows “basic rules from the tradition.”53 The result of the emphasis on 
the newness of the rationalistic method (itself a false newness) was to actually cease to offer 
adequate means of repair for particular problems in a given community. Peirce’s pragmatic 
method takes its starting point to be the Cartesian-Kantian tradition and its “problems,” outlined 
above, which he wished to repair.  
Generally speaking, the aforementioned problem in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition can 
be further defined as a hermeneutical problem. Ochs finds Peirce helpful as a hermeneutical 
guide in his writings when he begins to unfold his semiotic theory of language. For Ochs, 
Peirce’s theory of semiotics defines all inquiry as involving a relationship between a “sign, 
object, and interpretant.”54 Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, found in the words of Jesus in Matthew 
7:16, “Ye may know them by their fruits,” demonstrates this relationship in that the verse 
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suggests that the “meaning of a sign is disclosed only with reference to its interpretant.”55 This is 
precisely, as was suggested above, what the Cartesian-Kantian tradition often claimed to avoid 
by “identify[ing] the meaning of a sign (for example, a conception, or a text) with its object, 
alone, which object is identified with some conception precisively abstracted from the sign.”56 
For Ochs, however, while Peirce’s writings (especially his later writings) exemplify a 
corrective reading of the Cartesian-Kantian tradition, they also reenact the problems latent within 
the Cartesian-Kantian tradition. In light of this latter fact, and as a pragmatic reader of Peirce, 
Ochs describes his reading of Peirce as itself a “corrective performance of pragmatism.”57 He 
does so because, in a way analogous to Ochs’ evaluation of Kadushin’s “incomplete 
aftermodernism,” Ochs finds Peirce to be, in his methodological inconsistency as a “pragmatic 
realist,” operating with an “incomplete pragmatic theory.”58 In turn, in PPLS, Ochs identifies 
what he sees as inconsistencies in Peirce’s pragmatic writings and posits his own repair of 
Peirce’s writings on pragmatism for a particular community of Peirce scholars.59 
Ochs helpfully describes the kind of pragmatic and corrective activity that he feels Peirce 
recommends (in spite of his own inconsistencies) and that Ochs himself wishes to perform, 
through analogy to the twofold medieval Jewish mode of interpreting texts through their peshat 
(plain-sense) and their derash (interpreted sense).60 Ochs explains that the Rabbis usually 
approach a given text first by way of peshat but such readings move to derash when “something 
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burdensome in the plain sense stimulates them to do so: some apparent contradiction…or textual 
difficulty.”61 Derash, it should be apparent, only becomes necessary in the context of particular 
burdens, discerned by “a particular reader in a particular context.”62 What Ochs does in his own 
reading of Peirce is to begin with the plain-sense of Peirce’s writings, and move to an interpreted 
sense of Peirce’s writings when he finds that there are “burdens” or inconsistencies therein. 63 
Ochs associates this corrective performance as a form of derash or, with reference to Peirce’s 
method, with what he calls “pragmatic reading.”64  
While the finer details of Ochs’ pragmatic reading of Peirce are not essential for the 
purposes of this inquiry, what is necessary is to provide a rough outline of the contours of 
pragmatic reading as Ochs understands it in his study of Peirce. Ochs notes that pragmatic 
reading includes three stages of interpretation. The first stage of interpretation is, within a given 
tradition, “to identify which errant practices…may serve as stimuli for the 
prototypical…reform.”65 In the Cartesian-Kantian tradition which Ochs is speaking from by way 
of his study of Peirce, one of the errant practices has already been indicated above. The errant 
practice which stimulates the prototypical Cartesian-Kantian reformer is visible in that, although 
the inquirer is involved in a form of reformational inquiry that arises out of an already pre-
existent tradition, the inquirer claims to be doing otherwise (performing inquiry as if from a 
totally new tradition of practice).  
The second stage of interpretation is “to identify the errant practices that may serve as 
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stimuli for a particular…author’s own efforts to reform an antecedent tradition of practice.”66 In 
the context of his study of Peirce, Ochs identifies Descartes’ “intuitionism” as the errant practice 
that stimulated Peirce’s own reformative inquiry.67 Finally, the third stage of interpretation is “to 
identify the errant practices that may have stimulated both levels of his/her reform: first, the 
attempt to reform behavioral problems and, then, the attempt to reform the…[given tradition’s] 
method of reform.68 This third stage requires that “the pragmatist must apply to him-or herself 
the same method of interpretation that was applied to the Cartesian-Kantian author.”69 Ochs feels 
that Peirce does not complete this third stage. Peirce, according to Ochs, attempted to reform 
Descartes intuitionism rightly through the method of pragmatic realism, and errantly by way of a 
“conceptualist” method. While Peirce’s pragmatic realism sought the repair of problems in 
Descartes intuitionism with reference to the common suppositions of his own particular 
community, Peirce later utilized a conceptualistic logic which sought to simply replace 
Descartes’ intuitionism with “an opposing doctrine.”70  
Here it is instructive to draw Ochs’ criticisms of Yoder in again in an attempt to 
contextualize them even more. In his commentary in JCSR, Ochs registers concerns over what he 
sees as Yoder’s “tendency to draw stark distinctions between true and false judgements and to 
assume that what appears to be contrary of a true judgement must be a false judgement.”71 For 
example, Jewish faithfulness in exile precludes Jewish faithfulness in the land. Ochs’ criticisms 
arise out of what one might assume is his own pragmatic reading of Yoder’s restitutionist 
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corrective (restitutionist hermeneutics here being a kind of attempted ‘pragmatic’ vision of 
Christian history). While Ochs himself is not explicit about his critiques of Yoder being based 
off this method of reading, he gives hints through use of the term “burdens” with reference to 
elements of Yoder’s writings. Ochs employs that same “burden” language in his pragmatic 
reading of Peirce.72 Thus, it is instructive to ask, with Ochs, what a pragmatic, and so reparative, 
reading of Yoder might look like.  
In the first stage of reading, one might say that in Yoder’s writings he identifies the errant 
practices of the church that serve as stimuli for the prototypical radical reform. These errant 
practices are evident in the fact that the Magisterial Reformers sought to reform by way of 
correcting errors in ecclesial content (doctrine, etc.) while failing to correct the errors in ecclesial 
form (hierarchy, etc.). As a result, their reform/repair was ineffective. In the second stage, Yoder 
then identifies errant practices that stimulate his own efforts of reform. These errant practices are 
many, but they are summed up for Yoder under the banner of Constantinianism which, as was 
shown above, Yoder believed to be just as much a problem in the modern world as in the fourth 
century. What of the third stage of interpretation? Ochs argues that the third stage requires that 
“the pragmatist must apply to him- or herself the same method of interpretation that was applied 
to the [previous] author.”73 Does Yoder do this?  
While it is true that Yoder identified the insidious nature of Constantinianism in “its 
success in ‘brainwashing’ its adversaries, so that even when they react against it they do so in the 
same terms,” 74 nowhere does Yoder seem to self-consciously test his own reading according to 
this judgement. Said differently, Yoder does not test his own interpretation against the norm of 
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the incarnation so as to test whether or not he may have succumbed to his own “Constantinian 
temptations.” Just as Peirce didn’t complete this third stage, so too one might imagine that Ochs 
would argue that Yoder failed to complete it as well. This is so since, while Yoder sought to 
reform the Church rightly through recognizing errant practices of reform, he also did so errantly 
by way of a “conceptualist” account of the incarnation which failed to account for his own 
theological performance as one instance in a long line of an Anabaptist-Mennonite tradition. 
Instead of seeking the repair of problems in Constantinian Christianity through attention to the 
Jewishness of Jesus, Yoder sought to replace a false Constantinian church with a true 
restitutionist/Jewish church, a false body with a true body. 
As one might already suspect, the problem with this “either-or,” replacement approach is 
that it fails to see how a “false” church may not be totally false but distorted and in need of 
repair. In other words, the choice need not be between a true or false church but between 
reparative church practices and wounded church practices in need of their own repair. In his 
more recent Another Reformation, Ochs explicitly notes that the problem with hermeneutical 
models that are still captive to supersessionism is that they engender  
a way of reading that confuses the practice of formation with that of reformation, thereby 
reducing the church to some historically particular “way of life,” and a way that no longer 
has available to it the capacity for radical criticism, repair, and reform. Such a church 
would no longer have available to it the capacity to read Scripture as the living Word of 
God.75  
 
Based on what we’ve read above, it is reasonable to say that Yoder’s restitutionist hermeneutic 
would fit Ochs’ description above. Where Yoder begins by recommending the thesis that the 
Jewish-Christian schism “did not have to be” (a reformative claim), he turned to recommend a 
“way of life” that, against his intentions, involves the wholesale supersessionism of significant 
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traditions of Judaism and Christianity to pull it off (a formative claim). Ochs, on the other hand, 
writes as a Jew who has “worried that a doctrine of ‘nonsupersessionism’ might seem to leave 
Christianity too beholden to Judaism.”76 In other words, Ochs is concerned that Christians not 
empty themselves of the traditioned basis of their confession in an effort to reform Christianity 
because then they would be exchanging their tradition for a supposed universal ethic or way of 
life. Yoder’s “it did not have to be,” Ochs might suggest, ended up being construed, in certain 
moments, according to the logic of just such an exchange. 
Having reviewed the three stages of interpretation in pragmatic reading, it is important to 
also point out that these stages end “with recommendations about how the pragmatist may repair 
the behavioral problems that underlie his or her entire inquiry and how, analogously, 
the…reform may also be repaired.”77 For Ochs, Peirce’s pragmatism can be repaired through 
attention to his later “pragmaticist” writings which represent “a pragmatic reading and correction 
of his earlier pragmatism” and which, precisely in remaining vague and unfinished texts, present 
themselves as fruitful soil for future readers to complete the unfinished reform.78  
In JCSR, Ochs has suggested that Yoder’s radical reform could be repaired by future 
students of his work as they “continue the new order he introduced, and let go of the old one that 
he had failed to let go of himself.”79 How might this look? In this regard, Ochs has explicitly 
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identified Chris Huebner’s work on martyrs and his particular appropriation of Yoder’s “peace 
epistemology” as a hopeful example of how the new order in Yoder’s work might be 
continued.80 In the final chapter of this inquiry, several other possible ways of repairing Yoder’s 
restitutionist vision will also be offered. 
For now, however, it is instructive to return to Ochs’ scholarly trajectory in order to ask, 
what does his reading of Peirce have to do with his earlier search for a rabbinic logic? 
Surprisingly, Ochs describes his pragmatic reading of Peirce as his recommendation of Peirce’s 
pragmatism to communities of what Ochs calls Christian or rabbinic pragmatists or “scriptural 
pragmatists.”81 The final section of PPLS is addressed to this latter group of “scriptural 
pragmatists” whom Ochs feels can learn much from Peirce’s pragmatism. Just as Peirce 
understood pragmatism to be a “corrective” or “reparative” activity in response to a particular 
problem in some particular community (in his case, the Cartesian-Kantian school of inquiry 
represented by the texts of Descartes and Kant), so too, Ochs suggests, might scriptural 
pragmatists understand scripture as  
the prototypical narrative of how certain musers, often labeled “prophets,” were 
stimulated by their observations of human suffering to undertake corrective-and-
diagrammatic inquiries that terminated in the musers’ dialogues with God. God was 
known to them as the One who created the universe, who would repair, or redeem, the 
suffering in it, and who usually ended these dialogues by ordering the musers to tell their 
communities to care for their sufferers. To provide this care, the communities were often 
required to change their everyday practices, to change the methods they used to evaluate 
these repairs, and to change the ways they learned about these methods. These 
communities of philosophers read this Scripture as an authoritative graph of God’s 
creative, redemptive, and instructive activities...82 
 
Here it becomes evident that Ochs sees repair within the context now, not only of 
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pragmatic inquiry as defined by engagement with modern enlightenment thinkers like Descartes 
and Kant, but also within the practices of contemporary traditions that read scripture as the norm 
of the community. Thus, while much more could be said in regard to Ochs’ reading of Peirce in 
PPLS and how it relates to his own understanding of a scriptural pragmatism,83 more instructive 
for this latter purpose, will be to attend to how Ochs’ contextually specific involvement with 
rabbinic and Christian theorists demonstrates his understanding of scriptural pragmatism in 
action. From this, a further understanding of where Ochs differs with Yoder in terms of methods 
for reading scripture will become apparent. 
 
 
Bodies of Logic: Reasoning Relationally in Philosophy and Theology 
 
Above, Ochs was cited stating that in his early years he sought a way of reasoning that 
would be a salve to wounded humanity. The failure of modern rationalism as a total, 
universalizable system of reason, in conjunction with the reformation of reasoning that Ochs 
experienced in his studies in rabbinics under Kadushin and then through studies of Peirce’s 
pragmatism, led him to rethink the possible power and scope of differing modes or practices of 
reasoning “indigenous” to diverse human communities. Further, it led Ochs to consider how 
those differing modes of reasoning might, in certain contexts, relate and overlap with those of 
others. As a Jew, Ochs began to see within his own community one particular area of overlap 
occurring between Jews that practiced “Jewish philosophy and theology” with the express intent 
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of probing difficult questions of the time in light of a diverse range of Jewish literature.84 
Eventually, a community developed around these overlapping practices and came to be known as 
a society of “Textual Reasoners.”85  
“Textual Reasoners,” as described by Ochs, are characterized by their tendency “both to 
affirm and to reform the practices of both traditional Judaism and modern rationality” through 
examining each form of practice “in the terms of” the other (never, however, privileging one 
over the other), for the purpose of achieving the goals of tikkun olam, the repair of the world.86 
Assumed, in other words, in this mode of examination is that neither the practices of traditional 
Judaism on the one hand or modern rationality on the other are sufficient to reach the goal of the 
repair of the world. Repair, as a polyvalent concept that refers ultimately to a divine activity, thus 
functions within varieties of reason or logic, at once modern and at once rabbinic. 
When reading Ochs, it quickly becomes evident that many of the characteristics of TR 
accord nicely with the pragmatic method that Ochs appreciates in Peirce. This is the case as, a 
key dimension to Peirce’s pragmatic method is that it introduces “the category of ‘reparative 
claims’ as distinct from the more recognizable category of constative claims and…urge[s] a 
specific set of reparative claims about the modern logic of inquiry.”87 Within these terms and in 
light of some of the biographical details surveyed above, Ochs himself will be shown as 
consistently concerned with offering reparative claims about the modern logic of inquiry, 
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specifically through his own practice of “resituating reasoning within rabbinic practices of text-
reading.”88 That being said, bearing in mind that TR takes it as axiomatic that both critical 
reasoning and traditional Judaism should be performed together as mutually enriching practices, 
Ochs most certainly also works to “bring rationality into the study of traditional rabbinic…,” and 
it should also be noted Christian, “…sources.”89  
While TR represents one area where Ochs and others began to see differing forms of 
reasoning overlap in generative ways, namely those of philosophy and theology, a similar area of 
overlap also became significant in Ochs’ own engagements with Jewish and Christian text 
scholars while on leave to do postdoctoral work.90 It was during that time that seeds were planted 
that would later produce a collection of essays edited by Ochs called, The Return to Scripture in 
Judaism and Christianity: Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation. As stated in the 
introduction to the volume, postcritical scriptural interpretation, a phrase that Ochs holds rather 
loosely, “refers to an emergent tendency among Jewish and Christian text scholars and 
theologians to give rabbinic and ecclesial traditions of interpretation both the benefit of the doubt 
and the benefit of doubt…”91 Here a correspondence is evident between how TR was described 
above as a method of reasoning with texts that employed multiple logics (traditional and 
modern).  
The “benefit of the doubt” that these scholars give to traditions of interpretation is that 
such traditions have their own indigenous logics by which they dictate “rules of action” along 
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with “rules for interpreting the traditions themselves, including the tradition’s primary texts of 
scriptures and of scriptural commentary.”92 In other words, modern critical rationalities need not, 
as Ochs had already learned from Kadushin, provide the fundamental rules to evaluate scripture 
or scriptural traditions. That being said, post-critical scholars also give traditional texts the 
“benefit of doubt” in that critical rationality can have a clarifying function when purged of its 
own overconfidence and when employed in appropriate measure. 93 Ochs goes on to list three 
stages of postcritical scriptural interpretation as a reparative or reformative activity which in 
some ways parallel the three stages of interpretation that Ochs described in his pragmatic reading 
of Peirce. First, the postcritical scriptural interpreter is to 
identify mediating or modern interpreters as interpreters who reduce biblical 
interpretation to a dyadic semiotic by assimilating the mediating or modern interpretant 
of a biblical text to its meaning or referent.”94 [Second, the interpreter is to] “identify the 
consequences of a dyadic scriptural semiotic.”95 [Finally, third, the interpreter] “is to 
locate signs of a triadic semiotic within the biblical text itself, in particular as it is read in 
the primordial communities of rabbinic or of Christian interpreters.96 
 
A brief elucidation of these stages is necessary with reference to the analysis offered 
above. The mediating or modern interpreters in stage one are distinctly modern in that they 
perform inquiry on the basis of the assumption that the process of interpretation involves only a 
subject and object (a dyad). In the context of modern scriptural interpretation, the subject is the 
scriptures (or a particular text) and the object is the meaning of the scriptures. Modern scriptural 
interpretation is identifiable in the way in which it often assumes that the meaning (object) of the 
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text in question (subject) corresponds “intrinsically” to the logical framework of the interpreter, 
without acknowledgment of the interpreter’s role.97 Here is being replayed at once what Ochs 
saw as Kadushin’s “incomplete after-modern” tendencies, Peirce’s “incomplete pragmatic 
theory,” and Yoder’s conceptualist or foundationalist tendencies. Texts of scripture need not be 
reduced to a timeless meaning through a “publicly self-authenticating foundation of logic.”98  
Of course Yoder himself claimed to reject this hermeneutic approach. He claimed that the 
reduction of scripture to timeless, propositional meanings was typical of “High Protestant 
Scholasticism,” not the Free Church’s (and his own) biblical realist and restitutionist 
hermeneutic.99 Indeed, Yoder even argued that “the Jesus of history [is] mediated by real history 
(the traditioning process of the community)…”100 Elsewhere, in an essay commenting on the 
theology of Karl Barth, Yoder also notes positively that for Barth “because the meaning of Jesus 
was known within the categories of ordinary historical reality, he must be re-known, re-
presented, on through time in a celebratory recounting that ties the particularity of his history to 
the particularity of ours….”101 Then he continues, however, stating that such re-presenting must 
occur “without trusting to the ‘bridge’ of some mediating generalizations about the nature of 
things.”102 The question for Barth and Yoder, however is, while just any mediating 
generalizations should indeed not be trusted outright, are the traditions of the church to be 
thought of as examples of such generalizations? Building on Barth, Yoder’s application of the 
restitutionist hermeneutic to the Free Church vision and its Jewish prototype seeks after “the real 
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Jesus” without the bridge of tradition and at times Yoder seems to suggest that the meaning 
(object) of Jesus (subject) corresponds intrinsically to the community, as it is resurrected in 
newness and not through the dynamic and relational context in which the community finds itself 
over time.103  
In the second stage of postcritical scriptural interpretation, the interpreter is to ask what 
consequences the (above) modern approach has. The first consequence being that a dyadic 
semiotic undermines the living and relational component of the text. The text becomes locked 
into “dichotomizations…between text and ostensive referent; between the text’s reference and its 
performative…force.”104 Here again, in Ochs’ terms we might say that Yoder’s restitutionist 
hermeneutic seeks to discover, behind the diverse texts that witness to Jesus, the Jeremian core 
(ostensive reference) that captures the meaning of the textual witness to Jesus. By so capturing 
that meaning, however, there is a third component missing.  
The third stage is to, against the grain of a dyadic semiotic, seek to discover a “triadic 
semiotic,” a process of inquiry that involves not only subject and object, but also an interpretant, 
within the scriptures.105 The interpretant within the scriptures can be described in various ways. 
In the context of Ochs’ engagement with Kadushin, the interpretant was Kadushin himself. Had 
Kadushin recognized himself as the ‘missing’ third component to his inquiry, he might have 
avoided error.106 In many ways, the same could be said with regards to Ochs’ treatment of Yoder 
and his judgement that Yoder finally offers an unintended supersessionism. 
In his study of Peirce, Ochs describes the interpretant as also the symbol, the agent which 
serves a given community’s “deep-seated rules of knowledge” by the way in which, on the one 
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hand, it “influences the way its interpretant attributes meaning to it,” and on the other hand, in 
the way it also “grants the interpreter some freedom to transform the way in which that meaning 
will be retransmitted.”107  Post-critical scripture interpreters seek to repair the practice of 
scripture reading by attending to these symbols apart from errant modern logics.108 Here Ochs 
appeals again to the distinction between plain-sense and interpreted sense readings. Where texts 
offer no particular “burdens” in the plain-sense, then modern logics are often, according to Ochs, 
helpful. When, however, there are burdens in the text, this is precisely a situation where the text 
in question might be functioning symbolically and where it thus requires the interpreter to seek 
out its interpreted sense. If errant modern logics are utilized in this search, unsatisfactory results 
will follow as the text will be stripped of its life or agency in relation to the interpretive 
community. Post-critical scriptural interpreters seek to repair or reform modern logics so that 
they can be made useful for interpreted sense readings.109 
Postcritical scriptural interpretation is thus presented, by Ochs, as a type or performance 
of triadic semiotics, as these diverse Jewish and Christian interpreters of scripture all find 
themselves, in the context of their postcritical inquiry, hearing the complaints of scripture in the 
face of errant practices of reading.110 In this sense, repair functions for Ochs here in instances 
where triadic semiotics are embraced and pursued philosophically (in TR and elsewhere) and 
theologically (in rabbinic and Christian text scholars) for the purposes of repairing practices 
within communities of textual reasoners. Ochs notes that through the process of his postdoctoral 
work and his participation in a Yale seminar led by Moshe Greenberg on biblical interpretation, 
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he developed relationships with those he identifies as postcritical scripture interpreters, principle 
among them being Hans Frei and George Lindbeck, and through them others who were engaged 
in similar types of inquiry.111  
Related to his encounter with Frei and Lindbeck, and through a series of other events, 
Ochs also struck up a friendship with Stanley Hauerwas and in 1996 became co-editor with 
Hauerwas for the book series called Radical Traditions: Theology in a Postcritical Key.112 It is 
within the context of his friendship with Hauerwas and his work with him on the Radical 
Traditions series that Ochs’ engagements with Yoder and through those engagements, with many 
other Mennonite interlocutors, became a reality.113 How to further build on Yoder’s work in light 
of Ochs’ own work and his critical response to Mennonites will be the subject of the next 
chapter. For now, a brief summary of what has been covered in the above survey of Ochs’ work 
is necessary. 
Thus far we have seen that reparative hermeneutics functions in Ochs’ work in a number 
of ways. In relation to his early study of philosophy, repair functioned as a hoped for mode of 
addressing human suffering by way of the universal reach of the powers and precision of modern 
reason. Recognizing the limits of modern reason and the deeply embedded wounds that it 
created, Ochs learned to situate and perform the task of repair within the indigenous logics of 
rabbinic Judaism. Under Kadushin, Ochs saw that the writings of the rabbis, rather than offering 
propositional claims about universal reality, offered a framework of normative values (identified 
but not pre-defined) through which, in every new age, communities of Jewish practice could 
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discern rules for reforming their own communities. Recognizing Kadushin’s relative failure, 
however, to avoid finally presenting his understanding of the rabbis in propositional logic, Ochs 
learned to further understand repair as a pragmatic activity that always takes place within the 
“irrevocable contextuality” of a given community and its practices.  
Further, Peirce’s pragmatism taught Ochs to think of rabbinic logic within the framework 
of scriptural pragmatism, seeing the reading and interpretation of scripture itself as the context 
within which communities discern rules of reform or repair that can address particular instances 
of suffering in the world. Until the Lord returns, the people of God are called to this task of 
repair, and that means that this people will never see a single work of God as the end-point of 
their inevitable hermeneutic task, but will be called to continual encounters with the works of 
God in the earthy tasks of the people among whom God has made the divine presence known. 
 
Conclusion 
In light of the above analysis of Ochs, including his criticisms of Yoder, what paths 
might be made available for repairing Yoder’s theology in such a way as to make Yoderian 
theology without supersessionism possible? As an interpreter of Yoder and as a member of the 
Mennonite tradition of which Yoder was also a part, I see two necessary paths (although I’m sure 
more are available). First, Ochs’ emphasis on the importance of disclosing the performative 
context of reformative inquiry and specifically the particularity of the interpreter involved in the 
inquiry suggests that if Yoder’s theology is to be reformed, the particular context and tradition 
that informed his work will need to be adequately disclosed. Ochs’ own analysis has begun to do 
this, but more analysis is required. Furthermore, having exposed Yoder’s inquiry to the criterion 
of context specificity, a pragmatic reading of Yoder will have to be offered that completes the 
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third stage which, as was noted above, Yoder never completed. That third stage, it will be 
remembered, involved submitting the reformative activity of a particular agent of reform (Yoder) 
to the scrutiny of their own criteria for reform (for Yoder, the incarnation). Second, Ochs’ 
emphasis on an alternative logic for interpreting scripture suggests that if Yoder’s theology is to 
be reformed, alternatives to the way he read scripture and, I suggest, also tradition, will need to 
be provided. Taking up these two tasks in the final chapter, I now conclude this inquiry. 
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Chapter 4 
Repairing Restitutionist Hermeneutics 
 
 
 
Restitutionist Hermeneutics: An Ancient or Modern Vision? 
 
 In chapter two above, it was argued that Yoder’s restitutionist vision could not finally be 
identified as a Jewish vision. Yoder’s restitutionist vision required too radical a commitment to 
the notion of a fall that led him to imagine that those chosen by God to be representatives of the 
reign of God could so reject that divine choice that they would be totally cut off and replaced by 
a new people that obediently accepted that call, if only for a short time. A question that was not 
addressed at that point, but that can now be addressed is if the restitutionist hermeneutic is not a 
Jewish vision, is it a Christian vision? A Mennonite vision? Or is it something else? In order to 
explore an answer to this question, I bring in two critiques of Yoder that further expose the 
peculiar logic operative in restitutionist hermeneutics. 
The first critique, from Dennis Martin, identifies Yoder’s restitutionist perspective as a 
distinctly modern vision. In the last chapter, an analysis of Ochs’ own hermeneutic, along with 
his criticisms of Yoder, demonstrated that Ochs too believed that Yoder’s supersessionist 
tendencies exhibited a logic that was distinctly ‘modern’ in character. Martin’s critiques will help 
reinforce and nuance Ochs’ critiques. The second critique comes from Gerald Schlabach whose 
own reading of Yoder is particularly helpful for two reasons. First, Schlabach helps further 
disclose the performative context of Yoder’s use of the restitutionist hermeneutic. Second, by 
further disclosing that context Schlabach effectively completes the third stage of a pragmatic 
inquiry that Yoder never completed for his own reformative efforts. He does so by showing how 
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Yoder’s own theology might be seen repeating forms of Constantinianism. In concluding this 
inquiry, I then turn to imagine an alternate account of Yoder’s thesis, “it did not have to be,” 
which seeks to build on the positive dimensions of Yoder’s thesis while also incorporating some 
of the more suggestive trajectories in recent Christian theologies of Judaism and some of Ochs’ 
key methodological convictions.   
 
Dennis Martin on Restitutionism, Mennonites, and Modernity 
Regardless of Yoder’s attempts at carefully nuancing the restitutionist perspective on 
Christian history, critics still voiced their concerns. In his 1987 essay, “Nothing New Under the 
Sun: Mennonites and History,” Dennis Martin sought to expose what he believed to be a critical 
hindrance to Mennonite communities being at once able to sustain themselves past the first 
generation and adequately locate their Christian identity within the greater traditions of the one 
holy, catholic Church. That hindrance, according to Martin, was the presence of the restitutionist 
motif in Mennonite discourse, which Martin noted had remained the one constant in a tradition 
that had otherwise developed and changed its views on any number of important topics related to 
Christian self-understanding.1  
For Martin, the restitutionist motif represents all of those things that Yoder sought to 
distance himself from in “Anabaptism and History:” a rejection of history, an Edenic idealization 
of the first two centuries of Christian history, and the almost exclusive focus on (and perhaps 
even worship of) the new, the novel, and therefore supposedly superior manifestation of the spirit 
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in the radically renewed church of the present and future.2 Martin’s critique of restitutionist 
perspectives generally and of Yoder’s use in particular, is expressed concretely by him through 
the cipher of “modernity.” Martin argues that, rather than being a Judeo-Christian view of history 
that serves as the critical basis for reform in any given age (as Yoder argued), the restitutionist 
critique of tradition is a distinctly modern or enlightenment outlook on history that is suspicious 
of and rejects all tradition. By buying into the modern myth of progress, Martin claims that 
restitutionist readings of history inevitably encourage the church to disavow her roots in the very 
tradition that made it possible in the first place. In this way, Martin’s account of the ills of 
restitutionism as typified by the loss of its “roots” has striking similarities to Yoder’s own 
account of the ills of Constantinianism but with vastly different conclusions. 
In an essay which contains many resonances with “Anabaptism and History,” Yoder 
argued that the shift in church/world relations represented by Constantine had disastrous effects 
on the church’s witness.3 Martin’s critique in “Nothing New Under the Sun,” is best read as an 
alternate account of the “shift” Yoder described as “Constantinian” and is thus most helpful in 
understanding what makes Martin suspicious of the restitutionist perspective.4 In his well-known 
essay “Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics,” Yoder outlined seven key shifts that 
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 Martin, “Nothing New,” 2. 
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 See his “Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics,” in PK, 135-147. 
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(Evangelicalism, Calvinism, Catholicism, Anglicanism) and for cooperation with these mainstream groups in an 
apocalyptic age that challenges both the mainstream and the sectarian understandings of Christian teaching.” Martin, 
“Nothing New Under The Sun,” 2. Yoder’s audience was admittedly broader. While it no doubt included 
Mennonites, Yoder believed his account of the restitutionist thought pattern had a broad ecumenical usefulness in 
holding all churches to a high standard. 
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occurred in the “new era” of Christianity represented by Constantine.5 For the present 
engagement with Martin’s critiques, two of the shifts that Yoder mentioned are of particular 
importance, namely the shift in “ecclesiology” and “eschatology.”6  
First, according to Yoder, with Constantine’s ascendency the church became 
“everybody” and so ecclesiology took on a whole new definition.7 No longer did it take 
conviction to be a Christian because the law of the land made you one. However, “everybody” 
did not act in ways that were identifiably Christian and so Augustine crafted the notion of the 
invisible church to account for how there could be a small number of true Christians among a 
much larger group of those falsely claiming to be so.8 As a result of all of this, claimed Yoder, 
the church became more readily identifiable with the specialized hierarchy rather than with the 
people who, through persecution and minority status, demonstrated true commitment to their 
Christian convictions.9  
Linked to this first shift, Yoder claimed that Constantine’s legitimization of the religion 
of Christianity with state support and power produced a second shift, this time with respect to the 
original apostolic understanding of Christ’s Lordship. Where the original eschatology which 
funded this original Christian confession was characterized by belief in God’s hidden providence 
amidst persecution and the belief of God’s future return, Constantine now became the visible 
manifestation of God’s providence in securing the victory of the church over the world in the 
present. Yoder claims that these shifts, among others, effectively amount to a description of the 
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fallen system the church finds itself in and to which “efforts to renew Christian thought 
regarding power and society remain the captives.”10  
Here one can see Yoder unpacking again his understanding of specific dimensions to the 
fall of the church with references to the history of the third and fourth centuries. The way back to 
faithfulness in light of this fall, notes Yoder, is “to repent of the whole ‘where it’s at style’ [of 
Constantinianism] and to begin again with kenosis.”11 Kenosis here is, as can be intimated from 
the above analysis of Yoder’s treatment of the restitutionist thought pattern, the radical renewal 
which restitutionists desire. In emptying themselves of all attachment to the “where it’s at” style 
of what had come before, those seeking radical renewal can be most adequately prepared to be 
filled with the newness of the Spirit. 
At a key point in his critique of Yoder and his use of the restitutionist motif in Mennonite 
theology, Martin notes that “[n]early all the characteristics of ‘Constantinianism’ that Yoder 
adduces are more recognizable in the modern world than in the ancient or medieval world 
(dualism, establishment power, utilitarianism).”12 Yoder too argued that what he called 
“Constantinianism” had modern parallels. In fact, Yoder argued that as the original shift faced 
challenges external to it, it only dug in its heels all the more, producing new forms of 
Constantinianism (Yoder lists four) such that it became increasingly difficult to “be concretely 
critical” of the Church’s past.13 Where Yoder finds the Constantinian shift throughout much of 
Christian history but tends to concentrate mostly on the earlier centuries, Martin locates the 
problematics that Yoder identifies with Constantinianism primarily in modernity. Martin’s 
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purpose in “Nothing New Under The Sun” is to demonstrate how Yoder’s primary enemy should 
be modernity, not the “Catholic period of church history.”14  
Turning the strategy and logic Yoder uses in his essay “The Constantinian Sources of 
Western Social Ethics” against him, Martin argues that the restitutionist motif in Mennonite 
theology effects a shift in previous definitions of “church” (ecclesiology) and the church’s 
understanding of the relation between “past” and “future” (eschatology) that were original to the 
Judaic-Christian heritage.15 First, Martin argues that the church was understood by pre-modern 
Christians to be a unity of body and spirit and as such, it was understood that the church’s 
essence would always be embodied, regardless of the “limits, tragedy, and ambiguity in 
history.”16 While failure and deep corruption no doubt occur within that body, the church will 
always be defined by the embodied tradition that carries it and never apart from it in a 
“recoverable body of facts” or in a purely spiritual essence that manifests itself periodically.17  
In fact, Martin claims that it is inconsistent for the restitutionist to argue at once that the 
church must be embodied and visible and then to turn against that visible body for the purposes 
of rejecting it as false. Following from this, Martin argues that reform will never be achieved 
through a rejection of history since a rejection of history, even with its examples of corruption, 
implies a rejection of the church’s embodied spirit. Against Menno Simons’ attempt to secure the 
church’s continuity through the Spirit, Martin wonders  
how ‘spiritual continuity’ counted for much in the face of Menno's vicious 
polemics denying any spiritual validity to the existing ‘old church.’ To split the 
institutional from the spiritual is, in effect, to deny continuity if one begins with 
the sacramental, embodied, institutional theology of Catholicism and its pre-
modern context. Only if one is already committed to a modern and Reformation 
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perspective can a dualistic distinction between spiritual and institutional be 
maintained.18 
 
Since continuity must always be embodied, for Martin, eschatology also had a meaning 
for pre-moderns that was different than that prescribed by modernity. Modernity, says Martin, 
can only conceive of eschatology in linear terms as an imminent event or a future state. For the 
pre-moderns, however, “future” was itself thought of as of a piece with the present and the past. 
Eschatology was immanent and thus did not refer to a future time but a timefulness that 
encompasses the past, present, and future.19 As a result of this different view of eschatology, the 
reform of the church was not understood as occurring through new beginnings constructed out of 
an ideal past, but through “re-presentations” of the newness that is already constitutive of 
“creation, incarnation, [and] salvation.”20  
Does Martin’s critique serve to confirm suspicions regarding Yoder’s supersessionism? 
Here it is pertinent to question to what extent Yoder privileges the present and future over 
against a robust account of the past. Against Martin’s critique that restitutionism privileges the 
new, Yoder would likely want to say that the new that deserves privilege is the newness of Jesus’ 
sovereignty which manifests itself in every age, not the newness of human innovation and 
knowledge as described in modern myths of progress.21  
But again, Yoder’s views on the fall, the real possibility and indeed actuality of apostasy, 
coupled with what amounts to his generally shallow treatments of the depths of Christian history, 
would seem to suggest that this newness can never take root over the long haul of history but 
must always manifest itself in an almost episodic way. As a result Yoder seems to promote a 
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kind of “ecclesial actualism,” an occurrence of the church-form in history which, because it is 
only an occurrence, in effect prevents any guarantee of institutional continuity.22 Thus, in any 
given age, an instance of economic supersessionism may be necessary to move beyond what had, 
at one time, been a faithful form of the church, in order to replace it with a new church-form.  
While Yoder is no doubt right to be critical of any total guarantee that institutions can be 
reliable vehicles of continuity, Martin is also right to wonder why such suspicion requires the 
rejection of institutions as nonetheless necessary vehicles of continuity. One might say that what 
Yoder’s account of the restitutionist thought pattern fails to adequately account for is Christian 
faithfulness in history.23 The more difficult work, the work which Yoder did not choose to take 
up in those contexts, would have been to refuse rejecting previous history by the category of 
Constantinianism or the fall or any other movement in history and instead examine “each 
institution and each period of history for its own sake.”24   
 
Gerald Schlabach on Yoder and Continuity 
In a much more recent essay, Gerald Schlabach brings similar critiques to bear on Yoder, 
although not through direct concentration on Yoder’s restitutionist perspective. In the same vein 
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as Martin, Schlabach situates the theology of Yoder and the Concern Group25 he was a part of in 
terms of a strategy for “how Mennonites might relate faithfully to the modern world.”26 
Schlabach locates Yoder’s theology, both in its genesis and development, as characterized by a 
strategy he attributes to the Concern Group in general, namely, their “heroic pneumatology.” 
Schlabach describes heroic pneumatology as a call for “a radical movement of the Spirit to 
renew the church.”27 Much as Martin locates a shift in accounts of ecclesiology in modernity 
which separate spirit and body, Schalbach argues that the “stated ecclesiology of the Concern 
Group was almost entirely ‘pneumatic’ from the beginning, understanding the church to be 
dependent on the renewing work of the Holy Spirit and sometimes, it seemed, on little if 
anything else.”28 
 Yoder’s theology, notes Schlabach, no doubt develops in such a way that he nuances his 
earlier writings to “state the role of tradition in relatively positive ways.”29 In spite of this, 
Schlabach argues that Yoder’s Concern Group roots continue to be “at the bedrock of Yoder’s 
thought throughout his career.”30 Schlabach thus notes a tension in Yoder’s writings between, on 
the one hand, wanting to affirm the incarnation as an event in which God really does appear in a 
particular body and, on the other hand, wanting to protect that body from being carried forward 
in any “line of transmission that might proceed unbroken even for a while.”31 Schlabach argues 
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that Yoder sees the incarnation of Christ as something that one can “replicate” or that can recur 
in time through the power of the Spirit, but not re-present.32 
 Schlabach wonders, however, to what extent the pneumatic character of Yoder’s 
theology, while at once funding a robust critical imagination needed to address a lack in 
Christian moral imagination, might have finally restricted his imagination from perceiving other 
forms of “moral imperatives.”33 Schlabach lists several such moral imperatives like “continuity,” 
“stability,” and “sustainability.”34 It should be clear from Yoder’s account in “Anabaptism and 
History” why these are not his imperatives. If the fall of the church is precisely its attempt to 
sustain itself or create its own center of stability, then these same imperatives cannot be seen as 
morally worthy of the church.  
Schlabach detects an irony in Yoder’s rejection of these imperatives, however. While 
rejecting the imperatives listed above, Yoder and the Concern Group were nonetheless sustained 
by their roots in the Mennonite tradition, whose attention to the importance of these imperatives 
made possible their work. Thus, Schlabach notes, the imperatives for stability were achieved “in 
spite of” Yoder and the Concern Movement’s efforts at radical church renewal which sought to 
reject those same imperatives.35 Yoder and the Concern Group stood, after all, “in greater 
continuity than they themselves acknowledged with the Mennonite communities that formed 
them.”36 The logical consequence of Schlabach’s point here is that, if Yoder’s restitutionist 
hermeneutic produces any form of supersessionism, such as economic, then it does so only 
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discursively and not in reality. For in reality, Yoder has in fact superseded or replaced nothing or 
no one within his own tradition. This is not to totally vindicate Yoder, only to demonstrate how 
the church’s indigenous capacity for reform is stronger than one particular group’s potentially 
destructive ideas. 
The attempt to secure the “true” body of Christ from any particular appropriation of it 
was, after all, a failed attempt. The Mennonite body of which the Concern Group was a part, 
located as it was in particular times and spaces, was defined by a long tradition that had come 
before it and not solely by an unmediated spirit working through the scriptures. The Concern 
Group was Christian and radical then, not because it was able to throw off the fetters of tradition 
in order to recover a more basic vision of discipleship, available only in discontinuity with what 
had come before, but rather because what or more precisely who had come before them had 
provided the roots from which their radical critique was made possible.  
This critical reading of Yoder is profound and substantial, not because it calls into 
question the overall corrective function that Yoder’s theology (or that of the Concern Group) 
played and continues to play in the broad streams of Christian theology, but because it situates 
that corrective squarely within his particular performance of theology, within his belonging to a 
people who have not only been established periodically as church but have, through the creation 
of structures and institutions, tapped into the same resources of creation that the church has 
utilized since its earliest days. Schlabach thus completes the third stage of pragmatic inquiry 
discussed in the analysis of Ochs above. Schlabach critiques Yoder and the Concern Group’s 
“pneumatic” emphasis for how it replays a kind of Constantinian rejection of accountability to 
the incarnation. Only in Schlabach’s case, the incarnation that Yoder failed to consistently be 
accountable to was the incarnation of Christ in time in the body of the people called the church. 
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Revising Re-visions, Reforming Restitutionism 
This inquiry approaches its end. But significant work remains. Yoder’s restitutionist 
hermeneutic has been shown to produce forms of economic supersessionism, particularly as it 
endorses the view of a fall and a form of radical renewal which seems to preclude any 
indigenous and continuous operation of reform within the pre-existing people of Israel or the 
church. Now, however, further questions present themselves. Acknowledging the modern 
context in which Yoder wrote and which informed his restitutionist perspective in negative ways, 
can Yoder’s otherwise helpful insights regarding Jesus’ important teachings of the sovereignty of 
God and the summons to obedience be upheld while avoiding economic supersessionism?  
Ochs offers one helpful answer to this question: yes, in its best moments Yoder’s critical 
hermeneutic of the restitution of the church can help the church remember its place in a 
contingent and fallible reality; a reality that is at times filled with ambiguity, vagueness, and in 
which God’s reign operates at times in what seems to be arbitrary ways. The fact that Jesus was 
incarnate in such a reality should be enough to help Christians remember this. As we also saw, 
however, for Yoder Jesus is the reign of God in the flesh and this meant for him that by seeing 
Jesus Christians could have privileged access to “the grain of the universe.”37  
As we saw with Soulen and Ochs, this privilege, while not totally unwarranted as a 
Christian confession, at times led to Yoder making statements that engendered economic 
supersessionism. Yoder’s initial insight that the Jewish-Christian schism “did not have to be” 
was appropriate when it attested to what Yoder described as the meaning of the incarnation, 
namely, that God sovereignly chooses to call people on no account of their own and for purposes 
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that they do not initially set the agenda for. Yoder’s “it did not have to be” became 
supersessionist, however, when he located the schism as an instance of the “fall” of the church 
and in turn offered a clear statement regarding how Jews and Christians could “be” together in 
the event of radical renewal. This renewal, however, seemed to read “so many Jews somehow 
right out of Judaism,” and Christians right out of the Church.38  
Repairing/reforming what Yoder identified as the last two movements of the restitutionist 
thought pattern, the fall and radical renewal, could thus be one way to carry forward Yoder’s 
work without reproducing the errors he made. Such a repair/reform would necessitate 
transforming the harsh logic of a fall into the more scriptural logic of sin or unfaithfulness. The 
scriptures know of no epic fall or, for that matter, an ongoing series of falls within history. If the 
language of a fall is to be retained, it would have to be qualified so as to demonstrate how such a 
fall is not a state of being cut off, whether such a cut is self-inflicted or inflicted from on high. 
Similarly, the language of radical renewal would have to be transformed into the language of 
forgiveness and repentance through time. God’s reign does not only disclose radical moments of 
falling away and being radically renewed. Rather, God’s reign is disclosed in the slow movement 
of history in which disciples are called to “regard the patience of our Lord as salvation” (2 Peter 
3:15).  
How might such repair/reforms in the logic of fall/radical renewal impact Yoder’s 
provocative thesis? In drawing this inquiry to a close, I take these repaired/reformed views on the 
fall and radical renewal to heart in order to provide a sketchy alternative account to Yoder’s 
central thesis in JCSR, “it did not have to be.” By doing so, I hope to recommend this as one 
tentative and potential way that Mennonite communities today might carry forward Yoder’s 
                                                          
38
 Daniel Boyarin, “Judaism as a Free Church,” 19. 
102 
 
insights in JCSR in a way that avoids the supersessionist tendencies which Yoder himself failed 
to avoid. 
 
Repairing The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited:  
“It Did Not Have To Be, But It Happened” 
 
In The Jewish-Christian Schism Revisited, Yoder began by laying out several 
assumptions that he saw at work in the Jewish-Christian dialogue of his day which he felt needed 
to be challenged.39 The “standard account,” as Yoder called it, basically asserted that the “mutual 
exclusiveness” of Judaism and Christianity as they came to be defined by the end of the third 
century, was “inevitable” from the beginning.40 Against this, Yoder argued that the split “did not 
have to be.”41 As we already saw, Yoder argued this on the basis of what amounts to generally 
well-received assertions regarding the plurality of Jewish identity in the time of Jesus (there was 
no one normative Judaism) and Jesus’ own positive relationship to the law as one who 
“confirmed” it rather than freed people from it. Yoder also suggested that Paul’s own mission to 
the Gentiles was a distinctly Jewish mission to the Gentiles.  
As we also saw, however, the way in which Yoder made these arguments, specifically in 
his use of the restitutionist hermeneutic, was not immune from its own forms of supersessionism. 
How might Yoder’s well-received correctives be carried forward and the problematic dimensions 
left behind in revisiting the Jewish-Christian schism? A collection of essays arising out of a 
conference on “Jews and Christians: People of God” in 2001, contains hopeful signs of an 
imagination that could address questions like these.42 One of the essays included therein is 
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written by the Lutheran theologian Robert Jenson, a regular contributor to Jewish-Christian 
dialogue in North America and around the world. Jenson’s article makes a number of 
constructive suggestions to which I will appeal in the following few pages.  
The first comment that deserves attention is one that Jenson made in an earlier 
publication, the second volume of his Systematic Theology.43 There Jenson builds on the work of 
the Catholic Alfred Loisy to suggest that, according to the Gospel of Luke, “the church is…an 
eschatological detour.”44 For Jenson, this detour is recognizable due to the fact that, after Jesus’ 
departure to the right hand of the Father, the Kingdom did not come in fullness. This detour then 
points, as a rule, to the fact that “the church is neither a realization of the new age nor an item of 
the old age. She is precisely an event within the event of the new age’s advent.”45 What is the 
nature of this event? To be sure a key aspect to this event is that the Gentiles are gathered into 
Israel in some way. But history reveals that something else happens as a result of this event. 
Over time, the “lineage of Abraham and Sarah [from which Jesus descended] vanishes into a 
congregation of gentiles…”46 How should Christians interpret the reality of the church in light of 
this reality? 
For Yoder, loss of Jewish identity within the church represents a fall from a more 
normative state and therefore the renewal of the church involves a renewed relationship to the 
Jews. Jenson, in a sense, agrees when he claims that, as far as the church was concerned, the 
schism should not have happened either. Jenson’s conclusion, however, regarding the fact of the 
schism, is radically different from Yoder’s. Where Yoder offers the suggestion that “it did not 
have to be,” Jenson notes that because the fulfillment has not yet come, both the church and the 
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synagogue might understand their identities under the rubric of “detour,” signifying that neither 
the church nor Judaism expected what actually occurred in those first few centuries and that both 
await future fulfillment of the promises they were uniquely given. What is the nature of this 
detour, for Jenson? The detour is, for Jenson, a providentially ordered reality in which Jews and 
Christians are called by the one God to different paths. This reality, which is a result of schism, 
is a reality that God, the church must confess, has chosen.47 
How does Jenson arrive at such a conclusion? Would not Yoder object that such a 
reading of the schism fails to take full account of the tragic shift and the apostasy that occurred 
when the church lost its Jewish vision and received a Constantinian vision instead? Perhaps, but 
for Jenson to claim that this shift is in fact a divinely ordered occurrence is not to endorse a 
natural theology whereby whatever happens in history must be providentially ordered. Rather, it 
is to read empathetically the New Testament witness in order to notice how, from the very 
beginning, before the church was apparently co-opted by the state, the early church had begun 
dividing at the seams. Jenson appeals to the clash of Paul and Peter at Antioch as the prototypical 
example here.48 Table-fellowship between Jews and Gentiles was bound to cause severe 
disagreements and, eventually, open the door to schism. Somehow, God had unthinkably called 
the church into being and gave it a task that would not accord well with many Jews.  
In arguing against standard accounts of the schism, however, Yoder suggested that 
historians would do well in their discipline to avoid interpreting the story according to a logic of 
“causation,” and instead seek to “honour the dignity and drama of their struggle.”49 Jenson 
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wonders, though, “was this vision [Paul’s vision of table-fellowship] an actual possibility?”50 
Was Paul’s vision of Jew and Gentile together, in other words, the one right vision for the people 
of God after Christ? This type of wondering might be seen, in Yoderian terms, as already giving 
up on the dignity and drama of the early Jewish-Christian struggle; it would assume, in other 
words, that by virtue of Paul’s vision of table-fellowship, the schism had to be.  
While Jenson’s wondering surely sets him apart from Yoder here, the key difference 
between Jenson and Yoder really arises once it becomes clear what Jenson reads into the schism, 
namely, that God wants “to have a people identified by descent from Abraham and Sarah.”51 
Yoder too may have agreed with such a statement, but would have understood the meaning of 
“identified by descent” more according to the passing on of the calling of Abraham and Sarah, 
and not the particular flesh of Abraham and Sarah. For Yoder, 
You cannot get to Abraham by going back. Abraham’s entire life was one of leaving 
security behind and going forward to a promise. That is the very meaning of faith or 
faithfulness…You can’t get to Moses either by going back. Moses was looking forward, 
away from Egypt into the desert, off the banks into the bed of the sea, away from Sinai 
into the desert again. He was looking ahead to a land he would never get to enter…The 
fathers will not be saved by more careful reading of history...If there is one thing we have 
learned in the struggles of the last decades, it should be that one cannot preserve a 
heritage, if that heritage be one that is devoted to the praise of God and the following of 
Jesus. The very fences which are meant to defend the heritage stifle it. Only if the grain 
of wheat dies will its fertility be renewed in its offspring. Only when it springs forth in a 
new creative synthesis, where the past has proven the power to take the present up into 
itself and be renewed, can the past survive at all.52 
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The church is, for Yoder, the “new creative synthesis” that God, in Jesus Christ, made possible 
for the salvation of the world. This church’s heritage is precisely a “renunciation of the claim to 
govern history,” including one’s own place within that history.53  
For Jenson, however, “the church as it is will not provide” for the kind of heritage that 
Jews of today continue to understand the Old Testament witness to Abraham and Sarah to speak 
of. For Yoder, the schism did not have to be because Christianity was originally a Jewish vision 
and as such was already plural and diverse. But, for Jenson, there was an element to Jewish life 
that was not plural and that was that the Jews were called the people of God on the basis of their 
elected flesh, established through God’s decision and thus on no account of the choice of any 
particular Jew.  In the church, however, once the gentiles are welcomed in with open arms, 
suddenly this normative element to Jewish identity is, mysteriously, threatened and must 
providentially be protected. Thus, Jenson proposes that “God wills the Judaism of Torah-
obedience as that which alone can and does hold the lineage of Abraham and Sarah together 
during the time of detour.”54 For Jenson assumes that, in the detour that became Judaism, Israel 
is still called according to the flesh. Their flesh matters, not in a general sense, but in its 
particularity and for this reason, Jews cannot, strictly speaking, believe that “you cannot get back 
to Abraham by going back.”  
Jenson is well aware that such claims are not traditional Christian claims and that, for that 
reason, they must be grounded “christologically” if they are going to be well received.55 This can 
be done, for Jenson, precisely because of Jesus’ flesh as embodied Word and Torah. “The Word 
who has come in the flesh,” says Jenson, “belongs to the lineage of Abraham and Sarah, and this 
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fact belongs to his identity, to what traditional Christology calls the ‘one hypostasis’ of the Word 
who is Jesus.”56 The church, as it is today, is not descended from Abraham and Sarah according 
to the flesh, and yet its risen and ascended Lord is. “Going forward to a promise” is only possible 
when it is believed that God has been made available to the world in some substantial way. If the 
God of the enfleshed Jew Jesus Christ is to be made available, however, it must be made so, for 
Jenson, “in the form of the church and an identifiable community of Abraham and Sarah’s 
descendants.”57 For these and other reasons, Jenson argues that the church might discern that 
God wills this dual detour in the time before the fulfillment of Judaism and Christianity’s 
eschatological hopes.  
 
Conclusion 
In concluding, it is instructive to bring Ochs back into this conversation in order to ask in 
what way Jenson’s approach might be received by him as a corrective to Yoder’s approach.58 In 
2009, Peter Ochs was invited to deliver the J.J. Thiessen lectures at Canadian Mennonite 
University. Prior to his second lecture, Ochs began with a prayer that, with respect to our brief 
treatment of Jenson above, is worth quoting at length: 
 O God of Many Names, hear Our prayer.  
I believe you may have divided us by your Will. For if not, why did you give us these 
many names and give us languages to receive them differently and live them differently? 
As you did with us at Babel, you may have done in Jerusalem as well. You sent us forth as 
more than one people in service to your name, but you also left with each of us signs of 
the unity of your identity: for this reason the Jews pray, in the end of days may your name 
be one. Without imposing this prayer on my hosts, O Lord, I pray that you vivify these 
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signs in our midst. If you are not ready to receive us as one, then draw us one step closer 
to one as we shall You.59 
 
Here Ochs seeks to be true to his reparative hermeneutic in his reading of the schism. He reads 
the history of the Jewish-Christian schism, not as a sign of a fall, but as a sign that there is indeed 
a “unity of [divine] identity” in which Jews and Christians have a place in spite of their 
difference and division. One can thus accept Yoder’s thesis that “it did not have to be” in the 
sense that it may not have been, while also looking back at the schism and confessing, in the 
words of Ochs, that “you may have divided us by your Will.”  
This way of putting the matter seeks to recommend a corrective to the burdens that Ochs 
discerns in Yoder in that it positively acknowledges Yoder’s reading of the schism while offering 
a vague suggestion as to “who we want to be together” as Jews and Christians in dialogue in a 
world where two thousand years later we are very different peoples. Nonetheless, in our 
difference, the Church and Israel are still people who take up service to the name of the God of 
Israel, praying that the name of God would indeed be one.60 The vagueness of this suggestion is 
necessary precisely because the end of the age has not yet come. For Ochs, the pursuit of Jewish-
Christian unity is thus a potentially good task for Jews and Christians today, but how that unity is 
pursued must not ever be decided once and for all for that would mean the end of the age had 
arrived. In the meantime, the unity that Jews and Christians can share will always be a “unity in 
difference.”61 Perhaps had he lived long enough to engage Ochs in dialogue, Yoder too might 
have agreed, claiming that, from a Christian perspective, the unity of Jews and Christians at this 
stage of history is simply “hidden in Christ.”62 
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For Ochs, the most helpful example of one potential way that this unity in difference may 
be visible in communities of Jews and Christians today is in the practice of “scriptural 
reasoning.”  Scriptural reasoning consists of gatherings of Jews, Christians, and Muslims (the 
Abrahamic religions) around selected texts from each of their traditions. Those gathered sit 
together, reading the text, and allow unexpected insights to come through the process of study, 
only discovering later “what kinds of study might tend to nurture…‘unity-in-difference.’”63 
While in a number of places throughout Ochs’ writings he goes into much more technical depth 
in describing this practice, at its most basic Ochs describes it as “a practice that examined 
Scripture in all its manifold and complex ways: the wonder and discipline of God’s speech to us, 
a living process of covenantal life, a many-leveled collection of narrative, poetry and law; a 
challenge to our reasonings and an invitation to surprisingly new ways of reasoning.”64  
Of course one of the most crucial dynamics to this practice is that it forms individuals 
who belong to particular communities of faith. Scriptural reasoning thus has immediate 
implications, not only for those so bold enough to sit down together for long periods of text 
study, but also for communities that look to their scriptures as authoritative for discerning 
faithfulness in the present. This is important to point out and Ochs makes a special mention of 
the fact that the first gatherings of SR occurred, not because of an attempt at designing a new 
mode of interfaith peacemaking, but because of a confluence of individuals who were invested in 
their respective traditions and who were mutually concerned with the stifling ways in which 
scripture was being read in their communities.65 The goal of SR was, in a sense, to allow the text 
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to speak apart from any desire to use it as “denomination-defined set of doctrines.”66 Mennonites 
today would do well to take up this task as I fear that too often Mennonite distinctives regarding 
the centrality of the peace witness have become just such a “denomination-defined doctrine” that 
may predetermine how the community reads the text in advance of the task of reading it. Yoder 
too was at times a critic of this type of reading. That being said, Yoder’s own theology 
demonstrates an attempt to think so consistently about “seeing Jesus” through an ethical lens, 
that it is no wonder that many Mennonite communities today see Yoder as the foundational 
figure for establishing the theological basis of the Mennonite church’s peace witness. As we saw 
above, however, this is problematic because it closes down the meaning of the text too soon. If 
Christ really is to be the “Christ of Scripture,” notes Ochs, then he will be one who is “read and 
interpreted in community and, thus, vaguely.”67  
Might Free Church traditions of the Christian church locate their own convictions 
regarding the importance of scripture as an entryway into practices of scriptural reasoning like 
the ones Ochs describes above? Having read Ochs’ critiques of Yoder’s own use of scripture for 
his thesis regarding the Jewish-Christian schism, it becomes apparent that, for the Mennonite 
community, engaging in such practices will only produce fruit if restitutionist hermeneutics 
operative within such communities are repaired. Then, practices of scriptural reasoning will, for 
Mennonites, involve a slow and unpredictable process of establishing, where appropriate, 
relationships with Jews in which individuals trust each other to read each other’s scriptures under 
the conviction that the scriptures so shared become signs of God’s oneness amidst our division.  
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